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DECIPHERING LESSONS FROM THE ASHES:
SAVING THE AMAZON
ABSTRACT
For over forty years, Brazil, its subnational governments,
Indigenous communities, other nations, non-governmental
organizations, corporations, and individuals have worked to
conserve the Amazon rainforest through a staggering number of
diverse international initiatives. While some initiatives have
supported Brazil in decreasing the rate of deforestation over the
past fifteen years, the 2019 fires demonstrated that destruction
continues. Left unchecked, this irreversible destruction promises
to amplify. Fortunately, the long history of global involvement in
Amazon conservation provides ample lessons for effective, placebased deforestation prevention. Thoughtful and coordinated
international action can address the current lethal combination of
destructive factors: Brazil’s environmentally hostile federal
administration, its national economic recession, and surging
international demand for deforestation commodities.
This Article curates lessons learned from over four decades of
international efforts to conserve the Amazon rainforest and
synthesizes them into a more effective and efficient strategy. Due
to the urgency caused by the climate crisis and the Amazon’s
impending “tipping point,” this Article analyzes the issue through
a retrospective lens, drawing insight from past and existing
initiatives—because what has been done is possible. Because this
Article’s proposal relies on existing global alliances, political
motivation, institutions, and mechanisms, the burden of its
implementation is considerably reduced. There simply is no time
for starting fresh.

* S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, J.D. 2022; University of Utah, B.S.,
Environmental & Sustainability Studies, B.S. Political Science 2014. Sincere thanks to Professor Robert
Adler for his comments, edits, and encouragement. Thanks also to Luis Leyva-Castillo, Stuart Wilkins,
Rachel Grabenstein, and everyone else at the Natural Resources Journal for valuable editorial review and
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2019 a harrowing scene darkened news pages and social media
across the globe: orange smoke and flames streaking through canopies;1 thin lines of
fire separating ashy, skeletal remains of decimated forests from lush, green foliage;2
billowing smoke streams visible from space.3 That month alone, 310,000 acres of the
Amazon burned.4 The world looked on in horror and panic5 as the “lungs of the earth”
went up in flames.6 The hashtags “#prayforamazonia” and “#savetherainforest”
garnered hundreds of thousands of entries.7
Although the focus was on fires burning within Brazil’s borders, the
devastation and loss was felt globally.8 These reactions reflect a pervasive and
entrenched perception of the Amazon as a global commons.9 But the Amazon

1. Roland Hughes, Amazon Fires (photograph), in Amazon Fires: What’s the Latest in Brazil? BBC
NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49971563.
2. Rainforest Alliance, (@rainforestalliance), Amazon Fire (photograph), in INSTAGRAM (Aug. 21,
2019) https://www.instagram.com/p/B1bx2qRBUpr/?hl=en.
3. NOAA Satellites, (@NOAASatellites), Amazon Rainforest (photograph), in TWITTER (Aug. 6,
2019) https://twitter.com/NOAASatellites/status/1158766414473416705.
4. Taran Volckhausen, Escalating Firestorms Could Turn Amazon from Carbon Sink To Source:
Study, MONGABAY (Feb. 6, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/02/escalating-firestorms-couldturn-amazon-from-carbon-sink-to-source-study/.
5. See, e.g., Terrence McCoy & Maina Lopes, The World Wants to Save the Amazon Rainforest.
Brazil’s
Bolsonaro
Says
Hands
Off,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
23,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/23/amazon-rainforest-fires-brazil-world-reaction/;
Julia Hollingsworth, Amazon Fires: Madonna and Leonardo DiCaprio Among Celebrities to Speak Out,
CNN (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/23/americas/amazon-celebrities-social-media-intlhnk-trnd/index.html; Sophia Foggin, What World Leaders Are Saying About The Forest Fires in the
Amazon, LATIN AMERICA REPORTS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://latinamericareports.com/what-world-leadersare-saying-about-the-forest-fires-in-the-amazon/2961/; Maeve Campbell, The Amazon Rainforest is on
Fire, What Can You Do About It?, EURONEWS: GREEN NEWS (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.euronews.com/green/2019/08/22/the-amazon-rainforest-is-on-fire-what-can-you-do-aboutit.
6. Rainforest Alliance, supra note 2.
7. Yair Oded, The Amazon is on Fire, Our Instagram Feeds Will Bury #Prayforamazonia in 2 Days,
FAIR PLANET (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.fairplanet.org/story/the-amazon-is-on-fire-our-instagramfeeds-will-bury-prayforamazonia-in-2-days/.
8. See, e.g., McCoy & Lopes, supra note 5 (“Disturbing images of the forest aflame and cities
cloaked in smoke this week ignited a rapid and overwhelming international backlash”); Antonio Guterres,
Secretary-General
of
the
UN,
(@antonioguterres),
TWITTER
(Aug.
22,
2019),
https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/status/1164586391629705216 (“[W]e cannot afford more damage to
a major source of oxygen and biodiversity.”); Emmanuel Macron, (@EmmanuelMacron), TWITTER (Aug.
22, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://twitter.com/emmanuelmacron/status/1164617008962527232 (tweet of
President Macron of France) (“Our house is burning.”); Umair Irfan, Why It’s Been So Lucrative to
Destroy the Amazon Rainforest, VOX (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/8/30/20835091/amazon-rainforest-fire-wildfire-bolsonaro (displaying image of
protester in Italy holding sign “The Amazon is ours, is everyone’s”).
9. Alexi Barrionuevo, Whose Rain Forest Is This, Anyways?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2008)
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/weekinreview/18barrionuevo.html (“[A] chorus of international
leaders have ever more openly declared the Amazon part of a patrimony far larger than that of the nations
that share its territory.”); see ET Edit, Opinion, Amazon Alight, Global Commons, Sovereignty, ECON.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/et-editorials/amazon-alight-globalcommons-sovereignty/ (“The Amazon tussle highlights the precarious balance that must be achieved
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rainforest, while providing many benefits outside of its political boundaries, is not
legally a global commons.10 It is a forest completely within the boundaries of nine
nations, sixty percent in Brazil.11 The international community benefits from the
conservation of the Amazon, creating persistent tension between the Amazonian
states and the rest of the world while also yielding incentives for their cooperation.
For over forty years,12 Brazil, its subnational governments, Indigenous
communities, other nations, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and
individuals have been working to protect the rainforest through a staggering number
of diverse international initiatives. Many of these initiatives have supported Brazil
in decreasing deforestation over the past fifteen years.13 Still, as the 2019 fires
demonstrated, gaps in this web of initiatives allow for continued destruction of huge
swaths of rainforest.14 Unchecked, the destruction will amplify.15 Fortunately, the
long history of global involvement in the Amazon’s conservation provides ample
lessons on effective, place-based deforestation prevention tactics.
This Article curates lessons learned from over four decades of international
efforts and proposes to synthesize them into a more effective and efficient strategy.
Due to the urgency caused by the climate crisis16 and the Amazon’s impending
“tipping point,”17 this Article uses a retrospective lens—because what has been done
is inherently possible. While others have advanced theoretical proposals,18 this
between national concerns and international efforts to protect the global commons.”); Manuel Nabais da
Furriela, The Internationalization of the Amazon, 1 INT’L & COMPAR. ENV’T L., 17–20 (2000) (detailing
the history of viewing the Amazon as a “global resource” in need of “coordinated action” from the world);
McCoy & Lopes, supra note 5 (discussing Foreign Policy magazine’s headline “Who will invade Brazil
to save the Amazon?”).
10. See A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of A Shared
Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 38–40 (1997).
11. Paige Mason, Inadequacies of the Amazon Fund, 13 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 116, 117 (2010).
12. See Sandra Nicolle & Maya Leroy, Advocacy Coalitions and Protected Areas Creation Process:
Case Study in the Amazon, 198 J. ENV’T MGMT. 99, 103 (2017) (describing the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration’s impact).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See, e.g., Herton Escobar, Brazil’s Deforestation is Exploding—and 2020 Will Be Worse, SCI.
(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/11/brazil-s-deforestation-exploding-and-2020will-be-worse; Deforestation in Brazil Continues to Surge, Up 10.7 Percent in June, YALE ENV’T 360:
E360 DIGEST (July 10, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/deforestation-in-brazil-continues-to-surge-up10-7-percent-in-june.
15. Josh Kaplan, (Agri)business as Usual: Curbing Deforestation in the Amazon Rainforest, WILSON
CENTER: THINK BRAZIL (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/agribusiness-usualcurbing-deforestation-the-amazon-rainforest.
16. Myles R. Allen et al., Global Warming of 1.5°C., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL CLIMATE
CHANGE
[IPCC]
at
(2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/
SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf.
17. Thomas E. Lovejoy & Carlos Nobre, Amazon Tipping Point: Last Chance for Action, SCI.
ADVANCES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/sciadv.aba2949; see Gilvan
Sampaio et al., Regional Climate Change Over Eastern Amazonia Caused by Pasture and Soybean
Cropland Expansion, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS 17 (2007); Thomas E. Lovejoy & Carlos Nobre,
Amazon Tipping Point, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.science.org/doi/
pdf/10.1126/sciadv.aat2340.
18. Mason, supra note 11 (debt-for-nature swaps); Jacqueline Klosek, The Destruction of the
Brazilian Amazon: An International Problem, 6 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 149 (1998) (an
“international tropical moist forest reserve”); Ruslan Klafehn, Burning Down the House: Do Brazil’s
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Article argues for modifying and supplementing current initiatives rather than
implementing novel—and untested—approaches. Because this Article’s proposal
relies on existing global alliances, political motivation, institutions, and mechanisms,
the burden of implementation is considerably reduced. There simply is no time for
starting fresh.
Part I examines the Amazon rainforest, provides a condensed history of its
deforestation, and summarizes the current tension between deforestation drivers and
conservation efforts. Part II highlights existing mechanisms and institutions designed
to protect the forest and attempts to quantify or otherwise describe their impact on
deforestation reduction. Part III synthesizes the lessons learned through these
initiatives. Part IV then crafts a streamlined framework for conserving the Amazon,
arguing that the global community should double down on the strategies that have
proven effective—and cease other activities—while enabling greater transparency,
supporting third-party monitoring, and increasing the flow of resources to Brazil and
Brazilian NGOs. Finally, the Conclusion designates the impetus for this action.
I.

THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON

The Amazon rainforest represents “more than half of the world’s
rainforests,”19 covering nine South American countries and occupying over 2.6
million square miles.20 It is the most “biodiverse place on earth,”21 and boasts an
incredible abundance of nonrenewable resources.22 Additionally, the Amazon
rainforest stores billions of tons of carbon23 and produces six percent of the oxygen
released by the world’s photosynthetic organisms.24 “The forest also influences the

Forest Management Policies Violate the No-Harm Rule Under the CBD and Customary International
Law?, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 966 (2020) (“legal personhood for the Amazon Rainforest”); Roger
W. Findley, Legal and Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Use of Rainforests, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 17,
32 (1997) (“capture financial and technological benefits from . . . genetic resources by means of access
restrictions and concession contracts”); Tyler E. Hazen, The Effects of Brazilian Agricultural Property
Policies and International Pressures on the Soybean Industry, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L.
223, 243 (2010) (non-genetically modified soy).
19. Eder Johnson de Area Leão Pereira et al., Policy in Brazil (2016-2019) Threatens Conservation
of the Amazon Rainforest, 100 ENV’T SCI. & POL’Y 8, 8 (2019).
20. Brazil and the Amazon Forest, GREENPEACE, https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/issues/brazil-andthe-amazon-forest/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
21. Ashley Thomson, Biodiversity and the Amazon Rainforest, GREENPEACE (May 22, 2020),
https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/biodiversity-and-the-amazon-rainforest/.
22. Philip M. Fearnside, Nat’l Inst. Rsch., The Main Resources of Amazonia at 3–5 (Apr. 16, 1997)
(including minerals and agriculture); Ian Sample, Amazon Rainforest Threatened By New Wave Of Oil
and Gas Exploration, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/
aug/13/conservation.forests.
23. Fen Montaigne, Will Deforestation and Warming Push the Amazon to a Tipping Point?, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Sept. 4, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/will-deforestation-and-warming-push-theamazon-to-a-tipping-point; Philip M. Fearnside, Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: History, Rates, and
Consequences, 19 CONSERV. BIOLOGY 680, 686 (2005) [hereinafter Deforestation in Brazilian
Amazonia].
24. Peter Brannen, The Amazon Is Not Earth’s Lungs, ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/08/amazon-fire-earth-has-plenty-oxygen/596923/.
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water cycle on a regional and perhaps even global scale.”25 Over 60% of the Amazon
rainforest is in Brazil.26
A.

A Condensed History of Deforestation

In the Brazilian Amazon, large-scale deforestation can be traced back to the
1970s.27 The Brazilian federal government, under military rule, actively promoted
rainforest settlement.28 A new Trans-Amazonian Highway enabled this
colonization.29 The project facilitated deforestation by increasing access to the
forest.30 Deforestation skyrocketed to 7,876 square miles per year from 1978–1988,
an area equivalent to Massachusetts clear cut annually.31
In 1988, Brazil sank into an economic recession.32 In tandem, the
deforestation rate dropped almost in half.33 To stimulate recovery, the federal
government loosened its grip on the national economy and opened Brazil to more
global market forces and foreign industry.34 Deforestation rose, despite cessation of
government programs that had spurred deforestation previously.35 The increase was
due to “an increasing globalization of the forces of deforestation,” such as demand

25. Craig Welch, How Amazon Forest Loss May Affect Water—and Climate—Far Away, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/11/how-cuttingthe-amazon-forest-could-affect-weather/.
26. Kaplan, supra note 15.
27. Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 680.
28. SERGIO MARGULIS, CAUSES OF DEFORESTATION OF THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON xi (2003),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15060/277150PAPER0wbwp0no
1022.pdf; François-Michel Le Tourneau, Le Brésil Maîtrise-t-il (enfin) la Déforestation en Amazonie?[Is
Brazil Now in Control of Deforestation in the Amazon?], REVUE EUROPÉENNE DE GÉOGRAPHIE [EUR. J.
GEOGR.] 769 (2016) (Fr.), translated in François-Michel Le Tourneau, Is Brazil Now in Control of
Deforestation in the Amazon?, CYBERGEO: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF GEOGRAPHY (2016),
https://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/27484.
29. The Trans-Amazonian Highway, MONGABAY, https://rainforests.mongabay.com/08highway.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
30. Id.; Tatiana Dias, Operation Amazon Redux, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 19, 2019, 10:01 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/09/20/amazon-brazil-army-bolsanaro/.
31. Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 680–681; State Area Measurements and
Internal Point Coordinates, U.S. CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/geographies/referencefiles/2010/geo/state-area.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
32. Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 681.
33. Id.; ANDREW REVKIN, THE BURNING SEASON: THE MURDER OF CHICO MENDES AND THE FIGHT
FOR THE AMAZON RAIN FOREST 301 (2004). Brazil has a monitoring system that generates highly specific
information on deforestation dating back to 1988. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, BRAZIL, ENREDD+:
NATIONAL REDD+ STRATEGY 13 (2016).
34. PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46236, BRAZIL: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 3–
4 (2020).
35. MARGULIS, supra note 28, at xi.
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for soybeans and beef,36 fueled by the devalued national currency.37 Technological
advances, managerial improvements, and adaptation of cattle ranching to the
conditions of the Amazon38 also contributed by increasing the profitability of
deforestation.39
By the early 2000s, the Amazon became an ideal location for industrial
agriculture with its abundance of cheap land,40 land tenure insecurity,41 low labor
costs, and amenable temperatures.42 A pattern of deforestation emerged that would
continue through the next two decades. First, land was cleared by logging and fires.43
“Improved,”44 land became pasture for the burgeoning cattle herds of large
landowners.45 Ever expanding soy farms crept toward the forest frontier, pushing
cattle off their pastures and creating demand for more cleared forest.46 In 2004,
deforestation hit its peak: 11,000 square miles of clear cutting.47

36. Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 682; Daniel Nepstad et al., Slowing
Amazon Deforestation Through Public Policy and Interventions in Beef and Soy Supply Chains, 344
SCIENCE 1118, 1118 (2014) [hereinafter Slowing Amazon Deforestation]; Sabine Henders et al., Trading
Forests: Land-Use Change and Carbon Emissions Embodied in Production and Exports of Forest-Risk
Commodities, 10 ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 1, 10 (2015).
37. Nathalie F. Walker, Sabrina A. Patel, Kemel A. B. Kalif, From Amazon Pasture to the High
Street: Deforestation and the Brazilian Cattle Product Supply Chain, 6 TROP. CONSERV. SCI. 446, 447
(2013).
38. MARGULIS, supra note 28, at xi.
39. Id. at xviii; Umair Irfan, Why It’s Been So Lucrative to Destroy the Amazon Rainforest, VOX
(Aug. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/8/30/20835091/amazonrainforest-fire-wildfire-bolsonaro; Tomas Jusys, Changing Patterns in Deforestation Avoidance by
Different Protection Types in the Brazilian Amazon, 13 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2018).
40. Le Tourneau, supra note 28 (“[L]and laws in Brazil allow all citizens to settle on undeveloped
public lands and to claim ownership if they make private use of them and ‘improve’ them, the
transformation of a forest into agricultural fields being the easiest way of proving such an
‘improvement.’”).
41. Id.
42. What’s Driving Deforestation? UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/whats-driving-deforestation.
43. Marcelo Coppola, Where There’s Cattle Ranching and Soybean Farming, There’s Fire, Study
Finds, MONGABAY (July 20, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/07/where-theres-cattle-ranchingand-soybean-farming-theres-fire-study-finds/.
44. Le Tourneau, supra note 28; see also Daniel Nepstad, How to Help Brazilian Farmers Save the
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/opinion/amazondeforestation.html.
45. V. De Sy et al., Tropical Deforestation Drivers and Associated Carbon Emission Factors Derived
from
Remote
Sensing
Data,
14
ENVIRON.
RES.
LETT.
(Sept.
20,
2019),
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab3dc6; Jan Börner et al., Direct Conservation
Payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope and Equity Implications, 69 ECOL. ECON. 1272, 1280 (2010)
(80% of deforestation occurs on land owned by large landowners).
46. Liz Kimbrough, Soy and Cattle Team Up to Drive Deforestation in South America: Study,
MONGABAY (July 21, 2021), https://news.mongabay.com/2021/07/study-shows-how-soy-cattle-team-upto-drive-deforestation-in-south-america/; Le Tourneau, supra note 28.
47. Philip Fearnside, Business as Usual: A Resurgence of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,
YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Apr. 18, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/business-as-usual-a-resurgenceof-deforestation-in-the-brazilian-amazon [hereinafter Business as Usual].
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Starting in the mid-2000s, deforestation abruptly declined.48 By 2012,
annual deforestation had dropped 84 percent from 2004 levels, to just 1,700 square
miles of clearing.49 Several factors contributed: strong national enforcement of
Brazil’s environmental policies,50 new international initiatives focused on reducing
deforestation,51 increased yields of cattle on existing pasture,52 and decreased
undesignated forest land that together made deforestation riskier,53 more difficult,
and less profitable.54
However, in 2012 Brazil revised its Forest Code, “the most important legal
restriction on forest clearing on private lands”55 “removing [vital] restrictions on
deforestation.”56 By 2014, mounting political instability and an economic recession57
resulted in further national policy changes enabling deforestation, including a
“suspension of demarcation of [I]ndigenous lands, and a reduction of the size of
protected areas,” as well as “heavy budgetary cuts” to environment agencies.58 The
deforestation rate ticked up.59
In 2019, deforestation grew 34 percent from the year before.60 The rate
continued to rise in 2020, with 4,280 square miles deforested by December—a 12-

48. Slowing Amazon Deforestation, supra note 36, at 1118.
49. Business as Usual, supra note 47.
50. Nearly 50% of deforestation has been illegal under national law, which means that enforcing
national policy can result in a large reduction of deforestation. Duncan Brack, Background Analytical
Study, Forests and Climate Change, U.N. FORUM ON FORESTS 30 (March 2019),
https://www.un.org/esa/forests/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/UNFF14-BkgdStudy-SDG13March2019.pdf; Edenise Garcia et al., Dealing with Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, in ZERO
DEFORESTATION: A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE 143, 144 (Nick Pasiecznik & Herman Savenije eds.,
2017).
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. Slowing Amazon Deforestation, supra note 36, at 1120.
53. Deforestation became riskier due to fines and market rejection. Slowing Amazon Deforestation,
supra note 36, at 1120.
54. Id.; Doug Boucher, Sarah Roquemore & Estrellita Fitzhugh, Brazil’s Success in Reducing
Deforestation, 6 TROP. CONSERV. SCI. 426, 435 (2013); see also Érico Emed Kauano et al., Do Protected
Areas Hamper Economic Development of the Amazon Region?, 92 LAND USE POLICY 1, 2 (Mar. 2020).
55. Slowing Amazon Deforestation, supra note 36, at 1118; see also Christoph Nolte et al.,
Governance Regime and Location Influence Avoided Deforestation Success of Protected Areas in the
Brazilian Amazon, 110 PNAS 4956, 4957 (2013).
56. Business as Usual, supra note 47; Le Tourneau, supra note 28.
57. Matt Sandy, ‘The Amazon is Completely Lawless’: The Rainforest After Bolsonaro’s First Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/world/americas/amazon-firesbolsonaro-photos.html; William D. Carvalho et al., Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon, 17
PERSPS. ECOLOGY & CONSERVATION 122, 123 (2019).
58. NYDF ASSESSMENT PARTNERS, NEW YORK DECLARATION ON FORESTS FIVE-YEAR
ASSESSMENT REPORT 75 (2019); Stephen Eisenhammer, Rush for the Rainforest: One Brazilian Farmer
Tried—and Failed—to Ranch More Responsibly in the Amazon, REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/brazil-deforestation-cattle/.
59. Lisa Song, An Even More Inconvenient Truth, PROPUBLICA (May 22, 2019),
https://features.propublica.org/brazil-carbon-offsets/inconvenient-truth-carbon-credits-dont-workdeforestation-redd-acre-cambodia/.
60. Monitoramento do Desmatamento da Floresta Amazônica Brasileira por Satélite
[Monitoring Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon Forest by Satellite], PRODES http://www.obt.inpe.br/
OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes/.
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year high.61 2021 was no different: it saw 5,100 square miles deforested—a 15-year
high.62 The ongoing recession63 and overwhelming political support for
development64 has combined with surging international soy demand65 and record
beef exports66 to increase deforestation.
Today, the cattle industry is responsible for 80 percent of continued
Amazon deforestation.67 Ever-increasing soybean production continues to push
cattle pastures into the forest as soy farms expand.68 Of Brazil’s total national
production, it exports 20 percent of its cattle69 and 77 percent of its soy products.70
Most of these exports are consumed by China and the European Union.71 While
Brazil has commendable national environmental laws, it currently lacks the financial
ability and political motivation to enforce them due to the ongoing recession and the
pro-economic growth stance of President Jair Bolsonaro.72
61. Reuters, Brazil Amazon Deforestation hits 12-Year High Under Bolsonaro, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/world/americas/brazil-amazon-rainforestdeforestation.html.
62. Manuela Andreoni, Amazon Deforestation Soars to 15-Year High, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
19,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/world/americas/brazil-amazondeforestation.html.
63. Ignacio Amigo, When Will the Amazon Hit a Tipping Point?, NATURE (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00508-4; The World Bank in Brazil, WORLD BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).
64. Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, As Bolsonaro Keeps Amazon Vows, Brazil’s Indigenous Fear
‘Ethnocide’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/world/americas/
bolsonaro-brazil-amazon-indigenous.html.
65. Sal Gilbertie, The World’s Largest Soybean Exporter Wants to Import Soybeans. What
Happened?, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/salgilbertie/2020/10/20/the-worldslargest-soybean-exporter-wants-to-import-soybeans-what-happened/?sh=5e740fdc67d4.
66. Ana Mano, Brazil’s Beef Export Hit Record, Prospects Bright on China Demand, REUTERS (Dec.
10,
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-beef/brazils-beef-export-hit-record-prospectsbright-on-china-demand-idUSKBN1YE1TS.
67. Sandy, supra note 57; Henders, et al., supra note 36, at 10.
68. De Sy et al., supra note 45; see Henders et al., supra note 36, at 6.
69. The Chain: Brazilian Beef Linked to Deforestation May Re-enter U.S. Market, CHAIN REACTION
RSCH. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://chainreactionresearch.com/the-chain-brazilian-beef-linked-to-deforestationmay-re-enter-u-s-market/.
70. Feed and Livestock in Brazil, China, EU Consume Most Cerrado Soy, CHAIN REACTION RSCH.
(Dec. 17, 2019), https://chainreactionresearch.com/report/feed-and-livestock-in-brazil-china-euconsume-most-cerrado-soy/.
71. Jake Spring, A Fifth of EU Soy Imports from Brazil Could Be Tainted By Deforestation, Study
Says, REUTERS (July 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment/a-fifth-of-eu-soyimports-from-brazil-could-be-tainted-by-deforestation-study-says-idUSKCN24H2XN; Record Export of
Brazilian Beef in July; China Becomes the Insatiable Client, MERCOPRESS (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://en.mercopress.com/2020/08/11/record-export-of-brazilian-beef-in-july-china-becomes-theinsatiable-client; Katy Askew, EU-Mercosur Deal Faces Mounting Opposition as Soy and Beef Exports
Drive Deforestation in Brazil, FOODNAVIGATOR (July 22, 2020), https://www.foodnavigator.com/
Article/2020/07/22/EU-Mercosur-deal-faces-mounting-opposition-as-soy-and-beef-exports-drivedeforestation-in-Brazil#.
72. Londoño & Casado, supra note 64; Daniel Gallas & Daniele Palumbo, What’s Gone Wrong with
Brazil’s Economy, BBC (May 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48386415; Mariana
Simões, Brazil’s Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas/bolsonaro-brazil-environment.html; “Pro-growth”
is defined as “favoring or advocating the commercial development or exploitation of land and other natural
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In summary, about twenty percent of the Brazilian Amazon has been
deforested since the 1970s.73 As documented above, deforestation rates are
responsive to both market forces and national policy.74
B.

International Impact of Deforestation

Deforestation has reduced the Amazon to 82 percent of its former area,
dangerously close to a feared “tipping point” where the amount of deforested land
will spur a negative feedback loop, resulting in the “savannization” of the
rainforest.75
Much of the international concern over deforestation stems from its impact
on climate change. Because standing forests store carbon and the process of
deforestation emits greenhouse gases,76 deforestation is doubly detrimental as “the
second largest anthropogenic source of carbon dioxide.”77 Conversely, forest
conservation has been identified as one of the most effective climate change
mitigation strategies.78
The Amazon removes one to two billion tons of carbon from the atmosphere
per year, about five percent of annual human atmospheric releases.79 Deforestation
and fires release 500–700 million tons of carbon a year, reducing the net benefit of
the Amazon’s carbon capture by half.80 This contributes to Brazil’s position as the
world’s seventh largest emitter of greenhouse gases,81 with the greatest proportion
of its emissions82 from deforestation.83
resources, especially with minimal government restriction and regulation.” Pro-growth,
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/pro-growth (last visited Dec. 14, 2021).
73. Rhett A. Butler, Calculating Deforestation Figures for the Amazon, MONGABAY (Jan. 4, 2020),
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html.
74. See, e.g., Carvalho et al., supra note 57, at 122–23; Slowing Amazon Deforestation, supra note
36, at 1118; Edenise Garcia et al., supra note 50, at 144; Rhett A. Butler, Brazil’s Plan to Save the Amazon
Rainforest, MONGABAY (June 2, 2009), https://news.mongabay.com/2009/06/brazils-plan-to-save-theamazon-rainforest/.
75. Sampaio et al., supra note 17; Lovejoy & Nobre, supra note 17.
76. At COP25, a Call to Turn the Tide on Deforestation, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://unfccc.int/news/at-cop25-a-call-to-turn-the-tide-on-deforestation.
77. Xiao-Peng Song et al., Annual Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in the Amazon Basin
between
2000
and
2010,
PLOS
ONE
(May
7,
2015),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0126754.
78. Myles R. Allen et al., supra note 16; Claudia Stickler et al., The Rio Branco Declaration,
FRONTIER GLOBAL CHANGE at 2 (June 26, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/ffgc.2020.00050/full.
79. Montaigne, supra note 23.
80. Id.
81. Elisângela Mendonça, Bolsonaro’s Brazil Unlikely to Achieve Paris Agreement Goals: Experts,
MONGABAY (Sept. 22, 2019), https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/bolsonaros-brazil-unlikely-toachieve-paris-agreement-goals-experts/; Brazil Cuts Deforestation Emissions Below 2020 Targets,
REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-climate/brazil-cuts-deforestationemissions-below-2020-targets-idUSKBN1KV03X.
82. Le Tourneau, supra note 28.
83. Brack, supra note 50, at 3 (showing one third of Brazil’s total emissions is from deforestation);
REUTERS, Brazil Cuts Deforestation Emissions Below 2020 Targets, supra note 81; Brazil’s Carbon
Emissions Rose in 2019 With Amazon Deforestation, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/7/brazils-carbon-emissions-rose-in-2019-with-amazon-
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Deforestation also threatens the ecosystem services provided by the
Amazon rainforest.84 The Amazon rainforest contributes to the global water cycle,85
“helping to propagate rainfall and other climate patterns globally.”86 Deforestation
in Brazil leads to decreased precipitation and snowpack in California and the Pacific
Northwest.87 Additionally, deforestation imperils the incredible biodiversity in the
Amazon, a global concern since the 1980s.88
C.

Sovereignty Concerns

While Brazil has been a sovereign nation since 1822,89 the echoes of
Portuguese colonization and subsequent economic exploitation by foreign states and
corporations haunt the nation.90 Starting with a rubber boom in the late 1830s, a large
and continued international presence in the Brazilian Amazon has focused on
exploiting its natural resources.91
From 1970–1990, Brazil was under military rule92 that promoted
nationalism and labeled globalization a threat.93 To further this narrative, the
government promoted Amazonian settlement, “argu[ing] that a thinly populated
Amazon might create avenues for foreign powers to invade.”94 By the 1980s, that
campaign had spurred massive deforestation and catapulted Brazil onto the global
stage as an “environmental villain.”95 The country’s leaders viewed the following
international “calls for preservation . . . with great suspicion,” regarding them as
deforestation (“The growth of emissions in 2019 was driven by skyrocketing deforestation in the Amazon
rain forest, which accounted for 44 percent of Brazil’s total CO2 emissions, the study said.”).
84. Umair Irfan, Why It’s Been So Lucrative to Destroy the Amazon Rainforest, VOX (Aug. 30, 2019
7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/8/30/20835091/amazon-rainforest-firewildfire-bolsonaro; David M. Lapola et al., Limiting the High Impacts of Amazon Forest Dieback with
No-Regrets Science and Policy Action, 115 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES 11671, 11673 (2018)
(estimating the socioeconomic cost of degradation of the Brazilian Amazon to be in the range of $49–
$456 billion (USD)).
85. Michael Wolosin & Nancy Harris, Tropical Forests and Climate Change: The Latest Science,
WORLD RES. INST., June 2018, at 1.
86. Jonah Wittkamper, Investing in Amazon Rainforest Conservation: A Foreigner’s Perspective,
MONGABAY (Apr. 21, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/04/investing-in-amazon-rainforestconservation/.
87. David Medvigy et al., Stimulated Changes in Northwest U.S. Climate in Response to Amazon
Deforestation, 26 AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 9115, 9115 (2013).
88. Jane E. Brody, Concern for Rain Forest Has Begun to Blossom, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/13/science/concern-for-rain-forest-has-begun-to-blossom.html.
89. José
Fonseca,
A
Brief
History
of
Brazil,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/fodors/top/features/travel/destinations/centralandsoutha
merica/brazil/riodejaneiro/fdrs_feat_129_9.html?n=Top%252FFeatures%252FTravel%252FDestination
s%252FCentral+and+South+America%252FBrazil%252FRio+de+Janeiro (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
90. Furriela, supra note 8, at 17, 18.
91. Manuela Picq, Rethinking IR from the Amazon, 59 REV. BRASILEIRA DE POL. INT’L, Apr. 19,
2016, at 6.
92. Fonseca, supra note 89.
93. ANNE MARIE TODD, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY DISCLOSURE OF THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON:
NATIONAL POLITICS AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE, SAN JOSE STATE UNIV.
SCHOLARWORKS (2003).
94. Dias, supra note 30.
95. Luiz C. BARBOSA, THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON RAINFOREST 83 (2000).
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veiled attempts to interfere with Brazilian sovereignty and to “internationalize” the
Amazon.96 This suspicion was not assuaged when international figures, including Al
Gore, started espousing the view that, “[c]ontrary to what Brazilians think, the
Amazon is not their property, it belongs to all of us.”97 These comments “reignited
old attitudes of territorial protectionism” in Brazil and fueled “long-held
suspicion . . . that the real goal of foreigners is to take control.”98
Brazil’s leaders continued to evince wariness toward international influence
in the Amazon decades later, with its president advocating in 2008 to restrict
international access to the forest.99 Its civilians espouse similar views: in a 2005 poll
“75 percent said that Brazil’s natural riches could provoke a foreign invasion, and
nearly three out of five distrusted the activities of environmental groups.”100
With the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, nationalism has surged in
Brazil. President Bolsonaro has repeatedly accused international actors of exhibiting
a “colonialist mindset.”101 Bolsonaro also suggests that “radical environmentalists”
are exploiting Brazil to “further the economic interests of foreign countries,”102
stoking his constituents’ long-held fears. This distrust of international involvement
in the Amazon has significant implications for international efforts to reduce
deforestation.103
Today, deforestation rates are climbing steadily.104 This is due to the deep
economic recession Brazil has been experiencing since 2014, heightened
international demand for deforestation-causing commodities, a weakened national
Forest Code, the gutting of environmental enforcement agencies’ budgets, and a
federal administration openly hostile to forest conservation.105 Meanwhile, the
Amazon’s conservation remains a crucial strategy in every global climate change
response.106
The current conflict between these priorities—economic development and
climate change mitigation107—and the recent increase in deforestation indicate that

96. Id. at 83, 87.
97. Barrionuevo, supra note 8 (quoting then-senator Al Gore in 1989); REVKIN, supra note 33, at
289.
98. Barrionuevo, supra note 8; see also Larry Rohter, In the Amazon: Conservation or Colonialism?
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/world/americas/27amazon.html.
99. Barrionuevo, supra note 8 (discussing President Lula da Silva’s proposed law).
100. Rohter, supra note 98.
101. Dr. Theodore Karasik, Sovereignty Trumps Climate Concerns for Bolsonaro, ARAB NEWS (Sept.
26, 2019), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1560196.
102. Travis Waldron & Alexander C. Kaufman, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro Defends Deforestation: ‘The
Amazon Is Not Being Devastated’, HUFFPOST (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
bolsonaro-un_n_5d8a2989e4b0c2a85cb1ac8c; Jake Spring, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Slams Biden for ‘Coward
Threats’ Over Amazon, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-brazilenvironment/brazils-bolsonaro-slams-biden-for-coward-threats-over-amazon-idUSKBN26L2US.
103. See generally Andréa Zhouri, “Adverse Forces” in the Brazilian Amazon: Developmentalism
Versus Environmentalism and Indigenous Rights, 19 J. ENV’T & DEV. 252, 256 (2010).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.
105. See supra Part I.A.
106. See supra notes 76–78.
107. Alexei Barrionuevo, Brazil Rainforest Analysis Sets Off Political Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/world/americas/25amazon.html.
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international initiatives are not effectively influencing the drivers of deforestation to
promote conservation. While international actors may not be able to enact or enforce
Brazilian law directly, they can assert political and market pressure to effectuate
conservation. The next Part will survey current international initiatives seeking to do
so.
II.

EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TO CONSERVE
THE AMAZON

As Part I discussed, the global community—including Brazil—has major
incentives to conserve the Amazon rainforest: climate change mitigation,
biodiversity preservation, and global water cycle maintenance. The initiatives,
institutions, and mechanisms created to protect such functions have woven an
incredibly complex regime, involving traditional and innovative strategies,
partnerships, collaborations, and incentives. While detailing every such international
initiative is outside the scope of this Article, this Part identifies the most prominent
ones to showcase the diverse actors and strategic approaches at play, highlights their
actions toward deforestation reduction, and evaluates their effectiveness.
A.

International Agreements, Organizations, and Markets

Many interactions among nations are pursuant to treaties and agreements.
While no treaty or international custom has been interpreted to create enforceable
international rules preventing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,108 a multitude
of treaties, agreements, and conventions focus on its conservation by other means.
Such international agreements include treaties creating duties to share technology or
conserve specific endangered species, intergovernmental organizations encouraging
sustainable forestry management, intergovernmental trade organizations requiring
environmental protections, emissions trading markets, and state-run schemes
funding forest conservation.
1.

Amazon-Specific Treaties

One regional treaty involves all Amazon rainforest states: the Treaty for
Amazonian Cooperation (“ACT”).109 Under the 1976 treaty, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela agree to “promote the
harmonious development of their respective Amazonian territories” to “produce
equitable and mutually beneficial results and achieve also the preservation of the
environment, and the conservation and rational utilization of the natural
resources.”110 While ACT was created “as a cooperation mechanism . . . to reinforce
sovereignty and promote regional development – not to protect the Amazonian

108. Henry W. McGee Jr. & Kurt Zimmerman, The Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon: Law,
Politics, and International Cooperation, 21 UNIV. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 513, 539-340 (1990).
109. BEATRIZ GARCIA, THE AMAZON FROM AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 121 (2011).
110. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, art. I, July 3, 1978, 1202 U.N.T.S. 51.

Summer 2022

DECIPHERING LESSONS FROM THE ASHES

269

environment,”111 it contains several provisions that signal a joint interest in its
conservation.112
As a framework treaty, ACT’s aspirational—and vague—goals have been
underwhelming “best-endeavor commitments to achieving further cooperation.”113
ACT’s procedural obligations are similarly flimsy, “involv[ing] no more than the
exchange and dissemination of information,”114 and even these undemanding duties
go unfulfilled.115 As the treaty lacks both a conflict-resolution and enforcement
mechanism,116 there is little potential for intervention.117 Further, while the treaty’s
organization (“ACTO”) has repeatedly signaled interest in ACT serving as a
springboard for forest conservation among its parties,118 its intentions are impeded
by “scarce human and financial resources.”119 Member countries contribute to cover
ACTO’s institutional budget, but its projects are financed by “irregular and
unreliable” external sources including multi-lateral organizations and nongovernment organizations.120 As a result, the “great majority of projects approved by
the ACTO have not been executed.”121
Even in light of these shortcomings, the United Nations has “hailed” ACT
as a “model for regional conservation efforts” because it provides a stable “platform
to coordinate action”122 such as monitoring forest cover “and promot[ing]
international cooperation to combat illegal logging.”123 Other observers have been

111. MARIA ANTONIA TIGRE, REGIONAL COOPERATION IN AMAZONIA: A COMPARATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANALYSIS 355 (2017); Elizabeth G. Ferris, The Andean Pact and the Amazon
Treaty: Reflections of Changing Latin American Relations, 23 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF.
147, 162 (1981) (quoting Brazilian president Ernesto Geisel).
112. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 109, at art. VII (for example, Article 7 specifically
seeks to “maintain the ecological balance within the region and preserve the species” by promoting
research and the exchange of information on conservation measures adopted by member states”).
113. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 95; see also Ferris, supra note 111, at 157; TIGRE, supra note 111, at
390.
114. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 124.
115. Id.
116. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 110; TIGRE, supra note 111, at 390.
117. TIGRE, supra note 111, at 353.
118. Id. at 354.
119. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 120; see also TIGRE, supra note 111, at 353 (“While the bureaucracy
expanded, there are still no actual enforceable rules that ensure results.”); see also Int’l Waters Learning
Exch.
&
Res.
Network,
Documents:
Legal
Frameworks,
AMAZON
BASIN,
https://iwlearn.net/documents/legal-frameworks/amazon-basin (last visited Dec. 14, 2021) (“The Amazon
Cooperation Treaty has no explicit provision addressing funding and financing, . . . although the Member
States are required to contribute funds to the” treaty organization.); id. (“According to the Strategic Plan,
ACTO is studying alternative mechanisms for funding . . . in order to move beyond ACTO’s dependence
on foreign funds.”); id. (“Many of the project activities are financed with money from international
organizations (such as the European Union, various entities of the United Nations, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the Organization of American States).”).
120. TIGRE, supra note 111, at 372–73.
121. Id. at 371.
122. UN Dep’t of Econ. And Soc. Aff.: Forests, Amazon Treaty Body Hailed as Model for Regional
Conservation Efforts, (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.un.org/esa/forests/news/2013/04/amazon-treatybody-hailed-as-model-for-regional-conservation-efforts/index.html.
123. Id.
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less generous, faulting ACT for its failure to halt deforestation.124 For a treaty that
was never intended to promote forest conservation,125 the lack of impact on reducing
deforestation is unsurprising.
Brazil has also entered into several bilateral treaties surrounding the
Amazon.126 In the US-Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon
Biodiversity (“PCAB”),127 the U.S. and Brazil “jointly promote new and more
sustainable models for socioeconomic development of the region that will ultimately
conserve forests and biodiversity.”128 PCAB’s four objectives include creating
“sustainable value chains and economic activities,” consolidating protected areas,
engaging the private sector to “foster[] a sustainable-based economy,” and advancing
relevant technology.129
The U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) describes its
role in PCAB as a “convener and facilitator between government, civil society and
the private sector,” but notably, the U.S. has committed $80 million.130 The funding
supports 66 Protected Areas,131 conservation tracts that are hugely effective in
preventing deforestation.132 The partnership also lobbies for “the adoption or
implementation of [national] laws, policies and/or regulations that facilitate
conservation.”133
In addition, USAID sponsors the Partnership Platform for the Amazon
(“PPA”) to further PCAB’s economic goals.134 PPA “catalyzes private sector
engagement”135 to support start-ups that “foster sustainable use of forest and
biodiversity resources and decrease deforestation.”136 Incentivized by USAID’s “cofinancing” and “co-investing” commitments, private sector partners have invested

124. See GARCIA, supra note 109, at 120 (stating that the ACTO is currently ineffective and
questioning if the changes necessary to make the treaty effective will ever be adopted); see also TIGRE,
supra note 111, at 354 (arguing that the ACTO’s weaknesses “ultimately prevent more effective regional
cooperation” in reducing deforestation); see also Klafehn, supra note 18, at 962–64 (arguing that because
Brazil and other nations are not bound by the ACTO to consider conservation, the ACTO has failed to
regulate deforestation).
125. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 108, at 539.
126. See GARCIA, supra note 109, at 67.
127. USAID: Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity, About,
https://pcabhub.org/en-us/about (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
128. USAID, Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation, BRAZIL (last updated July 12, 2021),
https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environmental-partnerships.
129. USAID, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT: PARTNERSHIP FOR THE CONSERVATION OF AMAZON
BIODIVERSITY, at 14 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 PCAB ANNUAL REPORT].
130. Id. at 6, 8.
131. Id. at 16, 20.
132. See infra Part II.B.4.
133. 2018 PCAB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 20.
134. Id. at 52.
135. Partnership Platform for the Amazon–PPA, USAID: PCAB, https://pcabhub.org/enus/about/projects/partners-for-the-amazon-platform-ppa (last visited Dec. 15, 2021).
136. Id.
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over $1 million in PPA activities.137 These partners include some of the largest multinational corporations on the planet.138
This bilateral partnership has strong Brazilian support, and in 2018 it was
extended for another six years.139 PCAB’s framework as a “strategic partnership”
rather than a “traditional” donor-recipient-relationship likely contributes to its
approval.140
Despite its popularity, PCAB’s impact on forest conservation is difficult to
quantify since its goal is to “strengthen” areas already designated as protected.141 In
its own assessments, PCAB evaluates data on biophysical conditions rather than
deforestation prevention.142 Noting this deficiency, PCAB began developing an
“innovative tool” called TerraBio to assess its impact on deforestation in 2020.143
PCAB is noteworthy because Brazil, perpetually concerned about the
Amazon’s internationalization, has committed to an agreement in which the U.S.
invests directly into Brazil’s protected areas and attempts to influence national
policy. This suggests that when international agreements are framed in terms of
cooperation and include peripheral economic investment, Brazil is a more willing
partner.
2.

Global Forest Conservation Treaties and Organizations

The United Nations (“UN”) has facilitated the mass proliferation of
international agreements involving forest conservation due to the relevance of forests
to manifold international goals and objectives.144

137. Partnership Platform for the Amazon–PPA, supra note 135.
138. 2018 PCAB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 53 (showing logos of multi-national
corporations such as Dow, Coca-Cola, Bemol, Cargill, and Whirlpool).
139. USAID – Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity, US-Brazil Partnership Is
Extended Until 2024, https://pcabhub.org/en-us/news/pcab-news-highlights/us-brazil-partnership-isextended-until-2024 (last visited 1/10/2022).
140. See Brazil, USAID (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.usaid.gov/brazil.
141. See 2018 PCAB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 19.
142. See id. at 17.
143. USAID – Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity, USAID Partnership
Launches Innovative Tool to Assess the Impact of Investment on Biodiversity Conservation,
https://pcabhub.org/en-us/news/pcab-news-highlights/usaid-partnership-launches-innovative-tool-toassess-the-impact-of-investment-on-biodiversity-conservation (last visited 1/10/2022).
144. See DAVID HUMPHREYS, LOGJAM: DEFORESTATION AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
212–13 (2006). Because of the connection between forests and economic/sustainable development,
human rights, biodiversity, culture, and climate change, some of the UN’s other organizations have gone
on to create their own deforestation-prevention initiatives. Id. For example, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the UN, the Global Environmental Facility, the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification, the UN Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme, and the World Bank
are member organizations of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests, a group of established at the
recommendation of the UN to “promote sustainable management of all types of forests and to strengthen
long-term political commitment to this end.” Id.; see also R. Persson, Where is the United Nations Forum
on Forests Going? 7(4) INT’L FORESTRY REV. 348, 348–49 (Dec. 2005) (highlighting 25 years of UN
efforts; a UN forestry program, panel, and forum; “forest issues . . . discussed in other for a” including the
Convention for Biological Diversity, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention
to Combat Desertification, and CITES; and 270 proposals for action); CRISTINA MULLER, EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, Brazil and the Amazon Rainforest 27 (2020).
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This plethora of international organizations and agreements has established
a global norm of forest conservation,145 which has had two effects. First, it has
created social pressure on Brazil to pledge its commitment to combating
deforestation, starting at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.146 This global norm
continues to exert influence on Brazil. Pursuant to the 2015 Paris Accord, Brazil
promised to “significantly reduce its illegal deforestation rates in the Amazon by
2030, as well as restore and reforest . . . 4.6 million square miles of forest.”147 In
2021, it announced its plans to “step up” its pledge, committing to end illegal
deforestation by 2028.148
Second, this norm created the reciprocal duty of nations to assist Brazil with
its commitment to combating deforestation.149 This assistance has mostly taken the
form of research, which is critical to understand effective conservation strategies.150
The financing aspect of this duty—wealth transfer from richer nations to Brazil to
fund Amazon conservation151—has been woefully limited.152
Counterintuitively, the sheer number of UN initiatives “does not imply
better environmental protection,” as evidenced by the recent increase in fires and
deforestation in the Amazon.153 For several reasons, these institutions operate largely
independently, without “exploit[ing] areas of synergy,” resulting in a “disconnected
and multicentric” international forest regime.154
First, the overabundance of institutions creates competition for the same
limited resources.155 Second, these initiatives “are weak and ambiguous” because
145. See generally Kaplan, supra note 15 (noting international treaties, “pressure from civil society”
and foreign governments compels states to protect forests).
146. Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 881 (establishing a set of
Forest Principles).
147. Fabíola Ortiz, Ten Years On, Amazon Fund Receives Applause, Criticism, Faces New Tests,
MONGABAY (Dec. 21, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/12/ten-years-on-amazon-fund-receivesapplause-criticism-faces-new-tests/.
148. Manuela Andreoni, Once a Climate Leader, Brazil Falls Short in Glasgow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/world/americas/brazil-climate.html.
149. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 225.
150. See id. at 205; but see id. at 216 (“information on the Amazon is still fragmented and varies in
quality among Amazon States.”).
151. See, e.g., Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, supra note 146, at art. 9(a)–11.
152. Raymond Clémençon, From Rio 1992 to Rio 2012 and Beyond: Revisiting the Role of Trade
Rules and Financial Transfers for Sustainable Development , 21 J. ENV’T & DEV. 5, 11 (2012); see also
Mahesh Poudyal et al., Who Bears the Cost of Forest Conservation? PEERJ 3, July 5, 2018, at 3.
153. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 225; see also John Vidal, Many Treaties to Save the Earth, But
Where’s
The
Will
To
Implement
Them?
GUARDIAN
(June
7,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/jun/07/earth-treaties-environmental-agreements.
154. HUMPHREYS, supra note 144, at 212–13.
155. See, e.g., GARCIA, supra note 109, at 225–26; See, e.g., R. Persson, Where is the United Nations
Forum on Forests Going? 7 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 348, 351 (Dec. 2005) (discussing how the UN Forum
on Forests was created because of a conflict between other UN organizations, in turn creating “two
parallel, and possibly competing, processes.”); HUMPHREYS, supra note 158, at 212–213 (“[I]n the
absence of a forests convention the consensus on forest-related issues is fragmentary and incomplete.
Several international institutions deal with the different dimensions of forest conservation and use, and
obvious connections between these institutions are often not made. International forest policy-making
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global politics constrain the negotiating parties from implementing the bold
measures scientists assert are needed.156 Brazil itself has obstructed global forest
governance. In the UN Forum on Forests negotiations in the 2000s, Brazil negotiated
aggressively against “quantifiable and time-bound targets” which would have
provided the specificity that many international agreements lack.157 Additionally,
Brazil has consistently demonstrated its resistance to any “global forests convention
in which trade liberalization would . . . become entangled with conservationist and
human rights issues.”158 This inability to build consensus and coordinate action on
scientifically supported forest conservation measures greatly hampers the
effectiveness of these international institutions.159
Due to these impediments, critics characterize UN forest efforts as “costly,
time-consuming” initiatives that “benefit very few people and have only few tangible
results.”160 Further, some UN efforts, “even if well-intended, can be detrimental to
the environment.”161 The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest
(“PPG7”) and the International Tropical Timber Organization illustrate these
criticisms.
PPG7 was launched in 1992 to “support[] an integrated set of projects [to]
contribute to a reduction in the rate of deforestation of Brazil’s rain forests in a
manner consistent with [its] sustainable development.”162 Born out of the UN
Conference on Environment and Development and coordinated by the World Bank,
PPG7 connected the financial support of G7 countries, the EU, and Norway to forest
conservation in the Amazon.163 PPG7 developed a multitude of efforts focused on
“improving policies, institutional strengthening, and supporting pilot projects,”164
including the demarcation of Indigenous lands and creating extractive reserves.165
However, PPG7’s impact was diluted due to divergent and competing aims
of its funders,166 the lack of a “well-articulated overall policy for the region,”167 and
remains scattered among an array of institutions, and the parties to one legal instrument are not bound in
any formal or legal sense by the decisions of any other.”); Sergio Margulis, Working Paper No. 22: Causes
of Deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon, WORLD BANK at XXII (Dec. 2003),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15060/277150PAPER0wbwp0no
1022.pdf.
156. HUMPHREYS, supra note 144, at 214.
157. Id. at 112. For an example of a treaty without specific goals, consider ACT. See supra Part II.A.1.
158. HUMPHREYS, supra note 144, at 221–222.
159. Id. at 214–215.
160. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 225.
161. Id. (citing Daniel Howden, World Bank Pledges to Save Trees . . . Then Helps Cut Down Amazon
Forest, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 13, 2008), https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climatechange/world-bank-pledges-to-save-trees-then-helps-cut-down-amazon-forest-769997.html);
See
Generally McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 108, at 544–547.
162. World
Bank,
Brazil
Rain
Forest
Pilot
Program
Update
(2000),
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/146171468742149803/pdf/multi0page.pdf
163. Id.
164. Shoana Humphries et al., Searching for Win-Win Forest Outcomes, 125 WORLD DEV. 1, 2 (2020).
165. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 209.
166. Diógenes Salas Alves, Taking Things Public: A Contribution to Address Human Dimensions of
Environmental Change, 363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCIS. 1903, 1906–07 (2008).
167. Marko S.A. Monteiro et al., The Politics of Amazonian Deforestation, 5 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE 689, 691 (2014).
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“costly and time-consuming project processing.”168 In a ten-year evaluation, the
program conspicuously avoided quantifying its impact on deforestation
reduction169—likely because deforestation was almost double the 1994 rate by
2004.170 PPG7 was phased out in the mid-2000s.171
The International Tropical Timber Organization (“ITTO”)172 is “essentially
a trade association that brings together producers and importers of tropical timber to
encourage production.”173 It aims to “promote the conservation and sustainable
development of tropical forests”174 by helping producer countries adopt sustainable
forestry management practices.175 However, international timber demand is not a
leading driver of deforestation in the Amazon.176 Over the past 34 years, ITTO has
enabled the expansion of logging operations rather than limiting them.177 To this day,
ITTO’s prioritization of development is clear: in 2020, ITTO assigned Brazil’s
“minimal” production of Amazonian timber a low “effectiveness index score,”
framing conservation as undesirable.178 While ITTO has also funded important

168. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 210.
169. Imme Scholz & Regine Schönenberg, The Pilot Programme To Conserve the Brazilian
Rainforests, GERMAN DEV. INSTITUTE 97, 107-8 (2005).
170. Rhett A. Butler, Calculating Deforestation Figures for the Amazon, MONGABAY (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html.
171. Richard van der Hoff et al., Clashing Interpretations of REDD+ “Results” in the Amazon Fund,
150 CLIMATIC CHANGE 433, 438 (2018).
172. ITTA, the agreement creating ITTO, was developed in 1983 by 64 countries through the UN
Conference on Trade and Development. TIMOTHY CADMAN, QUALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: CASE LESSONS FROM FORESTRY 41 (2011). ITTO “was established under the auspices of
the UN in 1986.” International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/ldcportal/international-tropical-timber-organization-itto/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2020).
173. McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 108, at 542.
174. ITTO, From Liability to Asset, 29 TROPICAL FOREST UPDATE, 1 (2020),
https://www.itto.int/direct/topics/topics_pdf_download/topics_id=6529&no=1&disp=inline#page=20.
175. About ITTO, ITTO, https://www.itto.int/about_itto/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
176. Drivers of Forest Loss in the Brazilian Amazon, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017)
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/drivers-forest-loss-brazil-amazon (showing that selective logging
accounted for just under 10% of deforestation in 2013 and 3% in 2011); Christopher Ingraham, How Beef
Demand Is Accelerating the Amazon’s Deforestation and Climate Peril, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/27/how-beef-demand-is-accelerating-amazonsdeforestation-climate-peril/ (Cattle ranchers have “become the single biggest driver of the Amazon’s
deforestation, causing about 80 percent of it.”).
177. See, e.g., David Humphreys, Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest
Negotiations, 4 GLOBAL ENV’T POL. 51, 55 (2004) (“The consumer countries have pushed for a greater
emphasis on conservation, but without directly challenging the emphasis of the producers and trade
federations on expanding the volume of timber traded.”); Brian F. Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade
Policy: The Legality of Unilateral Attempts to Promote Sustainable Development under the GATT, 14
THIRD WORLD Q. 749, 758 (1993) (“The [ITTO’s predecessor organization’s] voting structure thereby
ensures that the goal of promoting the international trade in tropical timber outweighs its secondary
conservation role.”); McGee & Zimmerman, supra note 108, at 543, 549 (highlighting the potential for
“Japan’s transformation of the [ITTO] into an importers’ cartel”); Marlise Simons, Brazilian Is Looking
to Japan to Link Amazon to the Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1989 at 20,
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/19/world/brazilian-is-looking-to-japan-to-link-amazon-to-thepacific.html (discussing Japan’s potential investment in an Amazonian highway to increase access).
178. ITTO, supra note 174, at 20.
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projects that focus on monitoring and data collection,179 it remains unable to decrease
Amazonian deforestation because it targets the wrong industry and prioritizes
consumption.180
As these examples illustrate, UN forest conservation efforts have been
inconsistent and largely ineffective in the Amazon.181 There has been a complete
failure to “forge a coherent, performance-based approach that addresses . . . the basic
forces driving forest destruction;”182 most of the efforts have fallen short of any
direct, quantifiable impact on the rate of deforestation in the Amazon;183 and some
have actually increased deforestation.184
Although its efforts fall short of effecting significant change in the Amazon,
the UN has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to stimulate and enable forest
conservation efforts globally.185 The UN’s greatest strengths lie in its ability to
assemble world leaders together to discuss the topic,186 to raise funds from the Global
North,187 and to enable technical support including the collection and dissemination
of data.188

179. See e.g., ACTO, Completion Report: Monitoring Deforestation, Logging, and Land Use Change
in the Pan Amazonian Forest – Panamazon II (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.itto.int/files/
itto_project_db_input/2980/Competition/CompletionReport-REDPD02909R1F-ENG.pdf; see also
Project/Activity Search, ITTO, https://www.itto.int/project_search/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (listing
ITTO projects).
180. See, e.g., CADMAN, supra note 172, at 31; Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23,
at 682 (“Understanding who is to blame for deforestation is vital for any program that attempts to reduce
it.”).
181. William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of
Climate Governance 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 843, 864 (2010).
182. Id. at 866.
183. See, e.g., UMA LELE ET AL., FORESTS IN THE BALANCE: CHALLENGES OF CONSERVATION WITH
DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION COUNTRY CASE STUDY SERIES 128 (World Bank, 2000). The past fourdecades of UN initiatives show a myriad of attempts to make progress toward a goal associated with forest
conservation, often abandoned when it detracted from progress toward a different goal, or projects at small
enough scales not to infringe on any other projects and also too small to make a large impact on forest
conservation. CADMAN, supra note 172, at 29–30. Others of the projects, funded by the World Bank,
simply do not measure deforestation reduction as a “result.” See, e.g., RF Forest Resources Management
Project, Developing New Approaches to Sustainable Forest Management in Brazil, Dec. 13, 2005 Doc.
92580 (omitting any reference to deforestation but noting “the Forest Resources Management Project has
supported 78 community driven initiatives involving 10,000 local villagers and has trained 5,000 people
in forestry management.”).
184. See Barbara L. Zimmerman & Cyril F. Kormos, Prospects for Sustainable Logging in Tropical
Forests, 62 BIOSCIENCE 479, 479 (2012).
185. To be clear, it has not repeatedly demonstrated its ability to achieve forest conservation results.
See Our Impact, UN-REDD, https://www.un-redd.org/our-work/our-impact (last visited Dec. 15, 2021);
see also Project Map, UN FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION: FORESTRY,
https://www.fao.org/forestry/project-map/en/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2021) (displaying global forestry
projects); see also Forum on Forests, United Nations, https://www.un.org/esa/forests/index.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2021); see also World Leaders, Corporations at COP26, Take Major Step to Restore and
Protect Forests, UN: NEWS (Nov. 2, 2021).
186. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 144, at 192.
187. The Global North is “the group of countries that are in Europe, North America, and the developed
parts of Asia. Global North, Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary
/english/global-north (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
188. See TIGRE, supra note 111, at 314; sources cited supra note 150.
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Free Trade Agreements with Forest Conservation Agendas

Brazil is a member of the Organization of American States (“OAS”)189 and
the Common Market of the South (“Mercosur”).190 Both of these intergovernmental
trade organizations (“ITOs”) have adopted frameworks, regional agreements, or
projects supporting environmental protection in the Amazon.191 Additionally, Brazil
is negotiating agreements with two other ITOs—the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the European Union (“EU”)—that
would require Brazil to adopt certain environmental standards.
Forest conservation is imbedded in each of these ITOs. The OAS, which
has embraced environmental conservation since 1940,192 hosts environmental
summits,193 maintains a sustainable development policy,194 curates the InterAmerican Biodiversity Information Network,195 and executes conservation
projects.196 Mercosur’s founding treaty included “preservation of the
environment . . . as one of [its] overarching guidelines” and its documents also
“regularly list . . . sustainable development as among [its] broader aims.”197 In 2001,
Mercosur adopted a Framework Agreement on the Environment that “requires States
to cooperate by exchanging information on environmental laws, policies, and
practices.”198 The new free trade agreement with the EU199 “includes commitments

189. Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
190. Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041.
191. For the Mercosur, see Framework Agreement on the Environment of Mercosur art. 6, June 22,
2001; Declaration of Taranco; for the OAS, see Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OAS: MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/c-8.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2021); InterAmerican Biodiversity Information Network (IABIN), OAS, https://www.oas.org/en/sedi/dsd/iabin/ (last
visited Jan. 6, 2022); The Andes Amazon Protected Areas Database (AAPAD), OAS,
https://www.oas.org/dsd/AAPAD2/AAPAD2.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2022); Sustainable Development
and
Bio-Cultural
Conservation
in
the
Brazil-Suriname
Border
Region,
OAS,
http://www.oas.org/dsd/su_br/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
192. See 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,
OAS: MULTILATERAL TREATIES, https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/c-8.html (last visited Dec.
16, 2021).
193. Environment, Follow-up and Implementation: Mandates, OAS: Summit of the Americas,
http://www.summit-americas.org/sisca/env.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
194. Inter-American
Committee
for
Sustainable
Development,
OAS,
https://www.oas.org/en/cidi/cids.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
195. Inter-American Biodiversity Information Network, OAS, https://www.oas.org/en/sedi/dsd/iabin/
(last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
196. See, e.g., Press Release, Multi-lateral Project Launched in Suriname, OAS (Jan. 26, 2004),
https://207.237.157.11/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=SU-012604.
197. Kathryn Hochstetler, Fading Green? Environmental Politics in the Mercosur Free Trade
Agreement, 45 LATIN AM. POLITICS & SOCIETY 1, 5–7 (2003).
198. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 224.
199. Brazil, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/countries/brazil/.
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to fight deforestation.”200 Membership in the OECD201 would require existing
members to agree that Brazil is complying with the group’s recommended
environmental standards.202
While these ITOs expressly embrace environmental protection as a goal,
evidence of their impact is “scarce”203 for several reasons. To begin, when conflicts
between trade and conservation arise, trade is—unsurprisingly—prioritized.204 Other
trade agreements “have attempted to address the deforestation crisis” and have
ultimately had little impact or failed.205 Further, the ambitiousness of ITOs’
environmental goals are constrained by group membership. In Mercosur, Brazil is
the member-state with the most protective environmental laws, making it unlikely
that the ITO will have an impact on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.206
Fascinatingly, there is evidence that participation in Mercosur has
decreased Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions.207 As “[o]ver 60 percent of Brazil’s
emissions come from land use changes and deforestation . . . “ 208and a further 20
percent come from the agricultural sector which is inextricably linked to
deforestation,209 the emission decrease may result in part from deforestation
prevention.210 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these results will be replicated by
participation in the developing OECD or EU trade agreements. Research predicts
that trade liberalization between Brazil and Global North nations will decrease

200. Maria Laura Canineu & Daniel Wilkinson, How the EU Can Help Brazil Save Its Rainforest,
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 8, 2020 5:37 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/08/how-eu-can-helpbrazil-save-its-rainforest#.
201. About, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
202. Anthony Boadle, Amazon Fires Could Burn Brazil’s Bid to Join OECD Rich Nations Club,
REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/places/brazil/article/us-brazilenvironment-wildfires-oecd/amazon-fires-could-burn-brazils-bid-to-join-oecd-rich-nations-clubidUSKCN1VD2A9; see generally Discover the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/general/Keyinformation-about-the-OECD.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2022) (“the OECD helps countries develop better
policies for better lives, boosting prospects for stronger, fairer and cleaner economies and societies.”).
203. Inmaculada Martínez Zarzoso, Assessing the Effectiveness of Environmental Provisions in
Regional Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis, OECD TRADE AND ENV’T WORKING PAPERS, Feb.
2018, at 2.
204. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 145.
205. Andrew E. Miller, A Trump-Bolsonaro Free-Trade Agreement Is an Apocalyptically Bad Idea,
THE HILL (Aug. 9, 2019, 5:03 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/456912-a-trumpbolsonaro-free-trade-agreement-is-an-apocalyptically-bad; see also Lee C. Rarrick, Biodiversity Impacts
of Investment and Free Trade Agreements, 37 PACE ENV’T. L. REV. 67, 93–96 (2019) (discussing a USPeru free trade agreement).
206. See Hochstetler, supra note 197, at 7.
207. Mehdi Nemati et al., Are Free Trade Agreements Good for the Environment?, 23 REV. DEV.
ECON. 435, 445 (2018).
208. Luiza Martins Karpavicius, 120.24% Increase in Greenhouse Gas Emission Levels in Brazil
Since 1990, CLIMATE SCORECARD (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.climatescorecard.org/2020/12/120-24increase-in-greenhouse-gas-emission-levels-in-brazil-since-1990/.
209. Id.
210. But see, e.g., supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (explaining that in reality, the decrease
in emissions is likely not from deforestation reduction as Mercosur does not involve the major importers
of Brazil’s deforestation commodities—most beef and soy exports go to China and the E.U.).
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“overall environmental quality”211 due to market actors taking advantage of Brazil’s
less-enforced environmental standards.212
In summary, it appears that intergovernmental trade organizations play a
role in reaffirming the global norm of forest conservation. A lack of research inhibits
a conclusion on the direct impact of existing agreements on Amazon deforestation,
although logic dictates that the impact, if any, is not great. Brazil is not (yet) engaged
in trade organizations with the largest importers of the commodities that drive
deforestation: soy and cattle.213 While trade deals may provide leverage for the
international community to pressure Brazil to address deforestation, there is concern
that once the deals are signed, they will spur more deforestation.214
4.

Intergovernmental Markets: Emissions Trading

Emissions trading is a system in which carbon emission limits are
established and carbon emissions, carbon storage, and emission reductions become
commodities that can be traded internationally.215 In some trading schemes, nations
with standing forests may sell emissions credits equivalent to the amount of carbon
storage achieved by those forests.
Brazil considered entering into a forest emissions offset trading market in
2007,216 but ultimately decided against it due to feared consequences to its
sovereignty.217 Still, some subnational Brazilian entities have forayed into the

211. Nemati et al., supra note 207, at 435.
212. See Xing Yao et al., Free Trade Agreements and Environment for Sustainable Development: A
Gravity Model Analysis, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 14 (2019); Brazil Has Weakened Dozens of Environmental
Laws During the Pandemic, YALE ENV’T 360 (Feb. 24, 2021), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/brazil-hasweakened-dozens-of-environmental-laws-during-the-pandemic (“The current administration is taking
advantage of the Covid-19 pandemic to intensify a pattern of weakening environmental protection in
Brazil.”).
213. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (identifying China and the EU as the largest
consumers of Brazilian exports of beef and soy). Brazil is not yet engaged in a trade organization with
either the EU or China.
214. See Yao et al., supra note 212, at 1; Nemati et al., supra note 207, at 445; Luciana Ghiotto &
Javier Echaide, Analysis of the Agreement Between the European Union and the Mercosur, GREENS/EFA
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1, 64-66 (2019), https://www.annacavazzini.eu/wp-content/uploads
/2020/01/Study-on-the-EU-Mercosur-agreement-09.01.2020-1.pdf.
215. See Emissions Trading, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyotoprotocol/mechanisms/emissions-trading (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
216. See James Kanter, Brazil, Guyana and Rainforest Emissions Credits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2007,
7:22 PM), https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/01/brazil-guyana-and-rainforest-emissions-credits/
(describing Brazil as “volunteering” to sell “avoided rainforest destruction credit on the international
carbon market”).
217. FRANCES SEYMOUR & JONAH BUSCH, WHY FORESTS? WHY NOW?, CTR. GLOBAL DEV. 258–
259, 264–268, 281 (2016) (noting “the Brazilian government [had] long- and firmly-maintained
opposition to internationalizing the deforestation issue in the climate change policy arena” when it came
to considering emissions trading, that Brazil remained an “opponent[] of market-based finance” and that
“the Brazilian delegation insisted that [an independent verification] mechanism would compromise
national sovereignty”); see also U.N. Climate Change, Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution 2 (2015), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/
Brazil%20First/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20english%20FINAL.pdf (“Brazil will not recognize the use by
other Parties of any units resulting from mitigation outcomes achieved in the Brazilian territory that have
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emissions trading market. Currently, the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(“REDD+”)218 initiative coordinates several “voluntary” projects in which
subnational governments, nonprofits, and companies sell credits outside of an
established legal framework.219 Brazil’s Paiter-Suruí Indigenous community began
a REDD+ project in 2009, selling carbon credits to those who invested in forest
conservation.220 Unfortunately, the Suruí “project was suspended . . . after the
loggers destroyed more trees than all the credits sold.”221 The Paiter-Suruí experience
is not uncommon: a study of all the voluntary REDD+ projects found that there was
no corresponding increase in carbon storage for the buyer’s emissions.222
As this study suggests, the efficacy of rainforests as reliable carbon sinks
for emissions trading is in doubt.223 First, quantifying credits is incredibly difficult,
and variables like fire create the potential for assigning credits more value than they
actually offset.224 Carbon offsets assume that a tree will store the carbon for a century
after the offset is sold on the market225—but with fires, illegal deforestation, poor
monitoring, and a lack of enforcement, the trees sold as offsets are unlikely to live
for 100 years.226 Second, emissions trading can create leakage, a negative spillover
effect in which “deforestation regulations that pertain to a bounded geographical
region can result in a displacement of deforestation-related activities to other
areas.”227 Finally, offsets may not cause forest conservation; instead, they may

been acquired through any mechanism, instrument or arrangement established outside the Convention, its
Kyoto Protocol or its Paris agreement.”).
218. Thales A. P. West et al., Overstated Carbon Emissions Reductions from Voluntary REDD+
Projects in the Brazilian Amazon, 117 PNAS 24188, 24188 (2020); Arild Angelsen, REDD+ as Result‐
based Aid: General Lessons and Bilateral Agreements of Norway, 21 REV. DEV. ECONS. 237, 238–239
(2017); see generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on Its Thirteenth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.
219. Peter Yeung, REDD+ Carbon and Deforestation Cuts in Amazon Overestimated: Study,
MONGABAY (Nov. 2, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/11/279al-carbon-and-deforestation-cutsin-amazon-overestimated-study/ (“Unlike official REDD+ programs, grounded in federal law, the
voluntary projects are “decentralized” and only subject to rules set by Verra, a leading carbon-offset
scheme . . . “).
220. Max Nathanson, World’s First Indigenous Carbon Offset Project Suspended Due to Illegal
Mining, MONGABAY (Sept. 11, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/09/worlds-first-indigenousredd-program-ended-due-to-illegal-mining/; West et al., supra note 218, at 24191.
221. Song, supra note 59; see also Nathanson, supra note 220.
222. West et al., supra note 218, at 24189–190; Song, supra note 59 (explaining that the voluntary
REDD+ have sold hundreds of thousands of credits. For example, in 2014 FIFA bought 250,0000 credits
to offset the carbon emissions generated by the World Cup).
223. West et al., supra note 218, at 24190–191.
224. See Song, supra note 59; accord Kanter, supra note 216.
225. See Song, supra note 59.
226. Id.
227. Yann le Polain de Warouz et al., The Restructuring of South American Soy and Beef Production
and Trade Under Changing Environmental Regulations, 121 WORLD DEV. 188, 191 (2019).
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simply enable polluters to claim carbon offsets when no reciprocal offset has taken
place.228
The current situation in Brazil demonstrates grave weaknesses in the carbon
offset system for forest conservation. Emissions trading requires active monitoring
for lengths of time that extend far beyond the term of any elected official, and it is
highly susceptible to immediate destruction from natural disasters such as wildfire.229
Still, emissions trading remains enticing because it is an effective way to incentivize
rich countries and corporations to invest the funding necessary to conserve forests.230
However, an effective regime would have to ease Brazil’s sovereignty concerns.
5.

Voluntary Donations

Voluntary donations are a non-market approach that enables the Global
North to finance deforestation prevention without any individual reciprocal
benefit.231 There is only one large scale voluntary donation mechanism: the Amazon
Fund. Designed in 2007 and managed by Brazil as an offshoot of the UN’s REDD+
initiative, it crowd-funds from corporations and foreign nations.232 As a “meritbased” mechanism, the contributions reward Brazil for preventing deforestation as
measured by the annual deforestation rate.233 The “reward” is then used to support
measures “to prevent, monitor, and combat deforestation in the Amazon.”234 Over
the past 12 years, the fund has received $1.2 billion, and it has funneled the majority
to Brazil’s federal environmental agency.235 Some funds have also gone to
innovative, smaller-scale projects.236 Norway is the largest contributor to the fund,
accounting for 94 percent of the amount pledged, followed by Germany (5%) and
Petrobras (.06%).237
Notably, the Amazon Fund differs from emissions-trading markets in that
it gives greater priority to Brazil’s sovereignty. No credit is awarded to its donors,238
and donors are unable to direct how the donations are used.239 Brazil and its UN
collaborators created it as a non-market mechanism precisely because the Brazilian
government feared “that if someone donates US$10 he will soon think that he owns

228. See Julia Rosen, The World Is Watching as California Weighs Controversial Plan to Save
Tropical Forests, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
environment/story/2019-09-12/280California-tropical-forest-standard.
229. See Song, supra note 59.
230. See id.
231. Rhett A. Butler, Brazil’s Plan to Save the Amazon Rainforest, MONGABAY (Jun. 2, 2009),
https://news.mongabay.com/2009/06/brazils-plan-to-save-the-amazon-rainforest/.
232. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 242; Boucher, Roquemore & Fitzhugh, supra note 54, at 439.
233. Ortiz, supra note 147.
234. AMAZON FUND, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/home/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
235. Ortiz, supra note 147.
236. Id.
237. See Donations, AMAZON FUND, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/donations/ (last visited Oct.
2, 2020).
238. Van der Hoff et al., supra note 171, at 437.
239. Mason, supra note 11, at 133.
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the Amazon.”240 Instead, the fund is a “reward . . . rather than a contractual
commitment to provide further reductions.”241
It is difficult to evaluate how effective the Amazon Fund has been at
reducing deforestation, largely because the fund is results-based and collects data
accordingly.242 Still, independent consultants have concluded that “without [the
Amazon Fund’s] implementation, deforestation would have been even more
widespread.”243
Unfortunately, the amount currently contributed does not “cover even half
of the cost being incurred by Brazil” to prevent deforestation.244 Additionally,
because the reward is tied to deforestation rates, as rates tick up, funding decreases
commensurately, perversely creating less financial aid to prevent deforestation rates
from increasing further.245 Compounding that, the fund is susceptible to political
whims as it is run largely by the Brazilian government.246 Due to the current
president’s open hostility to rainforest conservation and the corresponding increase
in deforestation, the fund’s largest contributors have suspended their pledged
donations.247
In summary, while there is no shortage of initiatives among nations seeking
to reduce Amazonian deforestation, the impact of these efforts remains elusive. First,
many of the initiatives, such as ACT and Mercosur, do not detail specific
deforestation goals, which makes their impact difficult to evaluate.248 Second, most
do not include a mechanism to evaluate their impact on deforestation. While it took
five years for PCAB to commission a measurement tool, many of these initiatives
have simply never endeavored to do so.249 When these efforts have included a
measurement tool or are amenable to third party monitoring, the effort’s impact on
deforestation has often been poor or abysmal.250 These poor results stem from
overreliance and overdependence on Brazilian national actors for program
240. Erlend A. T. Hermansen et al., Co-Operation or Co-Optation? NGOs’ Roles in Norway’s
International Climate and Forest Initiative, 8 FORESTS 1, 12 (2017).
241. Van der Hoff et al., supra note 171, at 437.
242. Id. at 434.
243. Mid-Term Evaluation Report on the Effectiveness of the Amazon Fund 2008-2018, AMAZON
FUND
23
(Dec.
2019),
http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/export/sites/default/en/.galleries/documentos/monitoringevaluation/Mid-Term-Evaluation-Report-Effectiveness-Amazon-Fund.pdf. But see Song, supra note 59
(“Recent research on Norway’s contributions to the Amazon Fund noted that “a causal link to decreasing
Brazilian deforestation rates is yet to be proven with analytical rigour [sic].”).
244. Boucher, Roquemore & Fitzhugh, supra note 54, at 442.
245. Carvalho et al., supra note 57, at 123.
246. See Management, AMAZON FUND, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/amazon-fund/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2020) (“The presidential decree enacted on April 11 2019 (Decree n. 9759/2019) extinguished all
committees created by decrees or other administrative acts before January, 1st 2019 . . . To date, the new
governance of the Amazon Fund has not been established.”).
247. Norway Stops Amazon Fund Contribution in Dispute with Brazil, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-environment-norway-idUSKCN1V52C9.
248. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 110; Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, supra note
190.
249. USAID – Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity, supra note 143.
250. See supra discussion on voluntary REDD+ projects, notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
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implementation,251 a lack of adequate funding,252 and the failure to target the
overwhelming power of certain market influences due to the generic, one-size-fitsall nature of many international agreements.253 Third, even when goals are specific
enough to highlight when Brazil is out of compliance, many initiatives lack an
enforcement mechanism.254 Finally, forest conservation suffers from “treaty
congestion” and the dilution of resources, a common syndrome of global
environmental issues which ultimately “hampers implementation”255 as well as
evaluation.256
The Amazon Fund stands out as an international mechanism that has proven
effective at reducing deforestation.257 This is because, although prompted by the
UN’s REDD+ initiative, Brazil was able to design the program to fit its unique
circumstances.258 Additionally, the Amazon Fund has a specific goal (deforestation
prevention), includes an evaluation mechanism (satellite monitoring), supports an
activity known to influence deforestation (enforcement of environmental laws), and
has an effective incentive (funding).259
Even for all the identified shortcomings, international institutions play a
vital role in forest conservation.260 They are effective at convening global leaders,
enabling discussions about forest conservation, creating broad international norms
and obligations condemning deforestation, and facilitating financial and
technological assistance. These actions have created the structures, relationships, and
resources that enable on the ground deforestation prevention.

251. See supra notes 246–247 and accompanying text (discussing President Bolsonaro’s unilateral
extinguishment of the Amazon Fund’s management committee); see also Arno Fritz das Neves Brandes
et al., Endangered Species Account for 10% of Brazil’s Documented Timber Trade, J. NATURE
CONSERVATION, June 2020, at 2 (discussion of how, at the national level, poorly equipped environmental
agencies, loopholes in legislation, and a failure to fund conservation efforts has enabled logging of these
protected species under CITES).
252. See Boucher, Roquemore & Fitzhugh, supra note 54, at 442.
253. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussion of ITTO); see N. MARK COLLINS ET AL., CONSERVATION ATLAS
TROPICAL FORESTS ASIA & PACIFIC 70 (1991); TIGRE, supra note 111, at 357.
254. Klosek, supra note 18, at 147. For example, consider the Paris Agreement.
255. DONALD K. ANTON, ‘TREATY CONGESTION’ IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 8 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Coll. L., 2012) Research Paper No. 12-05),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988579.
256. See RÜDIFER WOLFRUM & NELE MATZ, CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2003); Chenaz B. Seelarbokus, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
(IEAs): Demystifying the Issue of Data Unavailability, SAGE J., 2-4 (2014); Erica Lymann, Rethinking
International Environmental Linkages: A Functional Cohesion Agenda for Species Conservation in a
Time of Climate Change, 27 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 1 (2015).
257. See supra Part II.A.5.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. TIGRE, supra note 111, at 357 (“The global level is essential to discuss solutions for global
problems,” even if it has “proven insufficient to halt deforestation, or face the challenges of climate
change.”); GARCIA, supra note 109, at 224–226.
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Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives

Multi-stakeholder initiatives are “hybrid mechanisms” that “engag[e] a
larger set of actors to tackle the specific drivers of deforestation.”261 Multistakeholder initiatives include partnerships among multinational companies,
industry associations, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), civil society
organizations, governments, and Indigenous communities; strategic pairings that
increase resources, expertise, compliance, and ownership involved in forest
conservation efforts.262 Conceptually, this carefully-assembled team approach makes
them more effective at managing global problems than state actors alone.263
Many multi-stakeholder initiatives have sprouted up around the Amazon,
mostly due to the perception that states are not able to solve the problem of
deforestation.264 Most of these initiatives utilize market-based instruments aimed at
“alter[ing] markets facing the private sector in order to make sustainable practices
more profitable and attractive than unsustainable ones.”265 This reflects the reality
that some drivers of deforestation are both economic and international in nature, and
therefore receptive to international market manipulation.266 Such mechanisms
include certification schemes; bans, boycotts, and moratoria; agreements to manage
supply chains sustainably; and the creation of new markets for environmental
services.
1.

Certification Schemes

Forest certification “is a process through which transnational networks of
diverse actors set and enforce standards for the management of forests.”267 These
standards create “market mechanism[s] with market access, price premiums, and
reputation as potential incentives”268 through the issuance of certificates “by an
independent third-party, attesting to the location and management status of a forest

261. Paulo Eduardo Dos Santos Massoca, Martin Delaroche & Gabriel Lui, Lessons from the Soy and
Beef Moratoria in Brazil, in ZERO DEFORESTATION: A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE 151, 157 (2017).
262. Ayelet Berman, The Rise of Multistakeholder Partnerships, 111 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 205,
205 (2017).
263. Id. at 206.
264. See, e.g., CADMAN, supra note 172, at 28 (“UNCED’s inability to combat deforestation
comprehensively has been identified as a catalyst for the growth of forest certification.”).
265. GARCIA, supra note 109, at 229.
266. E.g., Polain de Qarouz et al., supra note 227, at 191 (stating that 73% of the soybeans grown in
Brazil and 20% of Brazilian cattle product are sold internationally.); Mustafa Zia et al., Brazil Once Again
Becomes the World’s Largest Beef Exporter, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2019/july/brazil-once-again-becomes-the-world-s-largest-beefexporter/ (Brazil is the “world’s largest exporter of beef, providing close to 20 percent of total global beef
exports.”).
267. ERROL E. MEIDINGER, Forest Certification as a Global Civil Society Regulatory Institution, in
SOC. AND POL. DIMENSIONS OF FOREST CERTIFICATION, 265 (Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliot, and Gerhard
Oesten eds., 2002).
268. Axel Marx & Dieter Cuypers, Forest Certification as a Global Environmental Governance Tool:
What Is the Macro‐Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council? 4 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 408, 410
(2010).
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which is producing timber.”269 Introduced in the 1990s, certification schemes offered
a promising alternative to inter-state governance because they target markets
directly270 and therefore might create change much faster than international norms or
national policy revisions.271
More than 50 certification schemes address forest products and services.272
These certification schemes “opt[] to address the ‘problem’ of deforestation through
the ‘solution’ of sustainable development.”273 In theory, customers would seek out
certified products and pay higher prices for them, incentivizing producers to become
and stay certified.
FSC certification, “generally regarded as the most effective and legitimate
scheme” for timber certification,274 was created in 1991 by timber traders and NGOs
who wanted to “develop an independently audited global system for ‘good forest
management.’”275 It creates both international and national standards to “ensure[]
that products come from responsibly managed forests that provide environmental,
social and economic benefits.”276
FSC approved Brazil’s first national standard in 1997.277 While as of 2005
Brazil boasted rates of FSC certification similar to Canada and the U.S., most of the
certified forests are plantations and “less than one-half of one percent of total native
forest area is certified.”278 Additionally, those native forests owners who sought FSC
certification “already tend[ed] to manage their forests with care in order to
distinguish themselves from typical Amazonian forestry operations.”279
Notably, Brazilian corporations faced little pressure from activists to
become FSC-certified because “deforestation in Brazil is due mostly to illegal
logging and the clearing of land for agriculture, not to formal forestry operations.”280
By targeting a commodity (timber) that is not a major driver of deforestation in the

269. CHRIS ELLIOTT & RODOLPE SCHLAEPFER, Global Governance and Forest Certification: A Fast
Track Process for Policy Change, in ERROL MEIDINGER ET AL., SOC. AND POL. DIMENSIONS OF FOREST
CERTIFICATION 199, 200 (Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliot, and Gerhard Oesten eds., 2002).
270. Id. at 199–200; GARCIA, supra note 109, at 231 (explaining that forest certification can also be
mandated by national law).
271. ELLIOTT & SCHLAEPFER, supra note 269, at 206.
272. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT TOOLBOX,
FOREST CERTIFICATION, http://www.fao.org/sustainable-forest-management/toolbox/modules/forestcertification/in-more-depth/en/.
273. CADMAN, supra note 172, at 188.
274. Marx & Cuypers, supra note 268, at 409.
275. CADMAN, supra note 172, at 45.
276. FSC, Certification, https://us.fsc.org/en-us/certification (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
277. Ralph H. Espach, When Is Sustainable Forestry Sustainable? The Forest Stewardship Council in
Argentina and Brazil, 6 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 55, 65 (2006).
278. Id. at 70–71; Julie Mollins, Tougher FSC Certification Guidelines Would Make Forest Oversight
More Transparent in Brazil, FOREST NEWS (Nov. 18, 2018), https://forestsnews.cifor.org/58693/tougherfsc-certification-guidelines-would-make-forest-oversight-more-transparent-in-brazil?fnl=en.
279. Espach, supra note 277, at 72; see e.g., Maria Fernanda Ribeiro, A Brazilian Forest Community
Shows Certified Timber Really Does Work, MONGABAY (July 22, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/
2020/07/a-brazilian-forest-community-shows-certified-timber-really-does-work/.
280. Espach, supra note 277, at 75; see also Marx & Cuypers, supra note 268, at 429–430.
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Amazon nor a significant international export,281 FSC certification’s impact on
reducing deforestation is extremely limited.282
Consider instead a certification scheme that does target a major export
market contributing to deforestation in the Amazon: the Round Table on Responsible
Soy (“RTRS”). RTRS is a “voluntary environmental program[] developed by voting
members from industry and civil society that define social, environmental, and
economic guidelines for crop production.”283 The first RTRS certifications were
issued in 2011284 to incentivize producers to adopt sustainable practices to ensure
competitiveness on the global market.285
Adoption of RTRS has been sluggish. In Brazil, less than one percent of soy
was RTRS certified by 2017.286 This abysmal adoption rate is due to “low demand
for certified soy and the high cost of becoming certified.”287 The lack of demand
stems from the fact that many consumers are unaware the products they purchase
contain soybeans, such as dog food, eggs, or bacon.288 Additionally, due to selective
adoption, even certified Brazilian soy farms have not prevented deforestation.289
The impact of any certification scheme on deforestation reduction in the
Amazon is unconfirmed, yet likely minimal.290 Certification schemes face a number
of barriers that prevent success in the Amazon. First, such schemes lack clarity of
definitions and concepts.291 Second, because certification is optional, it allows for
leakage: other companies will fill the market demand for non-certified, cheaper
products.292 Third, it is difficult to determine to what extent such market
interventions generate additionality or “outcomes beyond business as usual;”
suppliers who opt into certification often do so precisely because it requires minimal

281. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
282. See Marx & Cuypers, supra note 268, at 427–428.
283. Rachael D. Garrett et al., Assessing the Potential Additionality of Certification by the Roundtable
on Responsible Soybeans and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, 11 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Apr.
2016, at 2.
284. Id.
285. Blair Cameron, A Step Toward Supply Chain Sustainability: The Round Table On Responsible
Soy in Brazil, 2005–2017, INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES 1, 6 (2017).
286. Id. at 1.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 20; Garrett et al., supra note 283, at 13 (explaining that as “[s]oy production occurs on
thousands of individual farms, and each producer has little or no brand identity,” farms have little fear of
damaging their reputations by deforestation activities).
289. Cameron, supra note 285, at 19.
290. See Shreya Dasgupta, Does Forest Certification Really Work? MONGABAY (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://news.mongabay.com/2017/09/does-forest-certification-really-work/
(“But
for
one
of
certification’s primary environmental goals — reducing deforestation — the evidence is currently poor.”);
Terry Slavin, Deadline 2020: ‘We Won’t End Deforestation Through Certification Schemes,’ Brands
Admit, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/deadline-2020-we-wontend-deforestation-through-certification-schemes-brands-admit.
291. Thaís Linhares-Juvenal & Till Neeff, Definitions Matter: Zero Deforestation Concepts and
Performance Indicators, 58 ETFRN NEWS 3 (2017), https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/
assets/Uploads/ETFRN_News_58.pdf; see also Mollins, supra note 279.
292. Meine van Noordwijk et al., Deforestation-Free Claims: Scam or Substance?, 58 ETFRN NEWS
11, 12 (2017), https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Uploads/ETFRN_News_58.pdf.
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change to their existing practices.293 Fourth, the chain of custody for some products,
such as beef, is difficult to verify and susceptible to laundering.294 Fifth, such
schemes are unable to “impose compliance on forest actors”295—there are no
enforcement mechanisms, only the risk of de-certification.
However, some remain optimistic about certification because these “nonstate regulatory mechanisms [are] an accepted complement to tackling problems
when the state proves insufficient.”296 The strategies posited to make certification
schemes more effective include focusing on clarifying definitions, creating
comprehensive monitoring of supply chains, and collaborating with governments.297
2.

Voluntary Corporate Commitments

Voluntary commitments are goals for deforestation reduction publicly
announced by corporations and industry associations, often in coordination with
NGOs, states, subnational governments, or Indigenous communities. Corporations
have relied on voluntary commitments as a response to consumer demand for forest
conservation for over 40 years.298 In the last decade alone, 400 members of the
Consumer Goods Forum “pledged to help achieve zero net deforestation in their
supply chains by 2020.”299 In 2014 the New York Declaration on Forests (“NYDF”),
“a broad coalition of governments, companies, civil society, and [I]ndigenous
peoples’ organizations,” set a similarly ambitious goal: halve tropical deforestation
by 2020 and end it by 2030.300 As applicable to the Brazilian Amazon, these
voluntary commitments focus on timber, soy, and cattle supply chains.
Some voluntary commitments are simply empty promises, lacking any level
of detail necessary for implementation and evaluation.301 These corporations pledged
admirable goals but “failed to specify concrete implementation mechanisms.” 302
Others chose certification schemes as the implementation mechanism, which are

293. Garrett et al., supra note 283, at 2 (emphasis added).
294. Claire Asher, Deforestation-linked Brazilian Beef Still Flowing Into International Markets:
Report, MONGABAY (Nov. 6, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/11/deforestation-linked-brazilianbeef-still-flowing-into-international-markets-report/.
295. CADMAN, supra note 172, at 188.
296. Id.
297. Till Neeff & Thaís Linhares-Juvenal, Zero Deforestation Initiatives and Their Impacts on
Commodity Supply Chains, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. 27–28 (June 22, 2016), http://www.fao.org/3/ai6857e.pdf.
298. See infra Part II.C.1.
299. Nick Pasiecznik, Herman Savenije, Christophe van Orshoven, Jan Bock, & Pablo Pacheco, Key
Issues: Making Zero Deforestation Commitments Work Better, 58 ETFRN NEWS viii, xi (2017),
https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Uploads/ETFRN_News_58.pdf; Slavin, supra note 290; see
also Sabine Henders et al., Do National Strategies Under the UN Biodiversity and Climate Conventions
Address Agricultural Commodity Consumption as Deforestation Driver?, 70 LAND USE POL’Y 580, 582
(2018) [hereinafter Do National Strategies].
300. About,
NEW
YORK
DECLARATION
ON
FORESTS:
PROGRESS
ASSESSMENT,
https://forestdeclaration.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
301. Do National Strategies, supra note 299, at 582.
302. Peter Jopke & George C. Schoneveld, Corporate Commitments to Zero Deforestation: An
Evaluation of Externality Problems and Implementation Gaps, CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RSCH. 25
(2018), https://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-181.pdf.
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notably unproven to be effective in the Amazon.303 These corporations are now
reevaluating such strategies, setting them back years in progress toward their
commitments.304
Further, selective participation and a lack of consensus on the definition of
relevant terms, such as “zero deforestation,”305 hampers the effectiveness of
commitments306 and inhibits public accountability. These shortcomings create
leakage between supply chains rather than an overall reduction of deforestation.307
In a study of 250 companies deemed powerful enough to effect market change, only
50 participated in voluntary commitments.308 Of those 50, the majority did not
require their suppliers to adhere to the same commitment.309 This loophole enabled
suppliers to participate in deforestation activities and simply sell those products to
non-participating companies.310
In program evaluations, studies have discovered “some progress” among
about half of the over 700 commitments analyzed, while up to a third of the
commitments were “dormant or delayed.”311 Notably, the 2010 Consumer Goods
Forum commitment to zero deforestation by 2020 has “abjectly fail[ed] to meet the
deadline,” and only six percent of companies that have made similar commitments
“are actually taking steps to address their high-risk facilities, suppliers, and/or
regions of operation.”312
Crucially, many of these commitments are “distracting attention” from
initiatives that are known to work.313 Voluntary corporate commitments grant
multinational corporations a reputational boost without actually requiring much, if
any, corporate investment or proven deforestation prevention.314 To make these
commitments effective, analysts posit increasing coordination with national
governments to develop supply-side pressures, designating geographical boundaries,
improving transparency within the supply chain, and removing any participation of
uncertified suppliers.315 Interestingly, these recommendations make voluntary
corporate commitments begin to resemble supply chain governance agreements.

303. See supra Part II.B.1.
304. Implementing and Scaling Up the CGF Zero Net Deforestation Commitment, CONSUMER GOODS
F. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/blog/implementing-and-scaling-up-thecgf-zero-net-deforestation-commitment/.
305. Do National Strategies, supra note 299, at 582.
306. Sam Lawson, The Flawed Focus on Corporate Voluntary Actions, 58 ETFRN NEWS 111, 114
(2017), https://www.tropicalforestalliance.org/assets/Uploads/ETFRN_News_58.pdf; Polain de Qarouz
et al., supra note 227, at 200 (advocating for “harmoniz[ing] corporate commitments across regions”).
307. Lawson, supra note 306, at 114-115; Polain de Warouz et al., supra note 227, at 201.
308. Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 13.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 27.
311. Pasiecznik, Savenije, van Orshoven, Bock, & Pacheco, supra note 299, at x; see also Jopke &
Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 7.
312. Slavin, supra note 290.
313. Lawson, supra note 306, at 111.
314. See Slavin, supra note 290; Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302 at 1.
315. Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 27–28; see also Implementing and Scaling Up the CGF
Zero Net Deforestation Commitment, supra note 304.
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Supply Chain Governance: Zero Deforestation Agreements

Zero deforestation agreements are multi-stakeholder initiatives that create
supply side interventions targeting entire industrial sectors rather than one
corporation’s supply chain.316 Unlike voluntary commitments, these efforts
coordinate key strategic players within targeted industries to set specific methods for
reducing deforestation and procedures for ensuring monitoring and accountability.
Further, these agreements establish a clear goal: the cessation of purchases from noncomplying suppliers within a certain location or after a certain date.317 Corporations
and industry associations often enter into these agreements due to public pressure,
usually following a scathing international report and the corresponding increased
public demand for corporate accountability.318
The 2006 Amazon Soy Moratorium (“SoyM”) emerged due to public
pressure to lessen deforestation caused by soy farm expansion in Brazil following
Greenpeace’s Eating Up The Amazon report.319 The two largest purchasers of
Brazilian soy, representing 90 percent of the market,320 voluntarily agreed not to
purchase or finance soy grown on Amazonian lands deforested after 2008.321 To
ensure compliance with the moratorium, the two trade associations joined with
Greenpeace, other NGOs, banks, and government officials to form the Soy Working
Group (“GTS”).322 The GTS “hire[s] an audit firm to check participants in the
moratorium for compliance” every year.323 Violating farms are identified by
“satellite and airborne monitoring system” and “blocked from selling to SoyM
signatories.”324 The success of this initiative has been its “strategic[] pressure on a
small number of powerful actors” who are susceptible to international reputational
harm,325 its reliance on “detailed and reliable information,” and its long-term
involvement of a “diverse set of stakeholders” including the Brazilian government.326
The 2009 Cattle Agreement is similar to SoyM, except that the agreement
does not call for zero deforestation but rather prohibits illegal deforestation, only
requires members to trace cattle to the fattening farm (not the beginning of the supply
chain), and only applies to 38 percent of the market.327 Other differences lie in the

316. Holly K. Gibbs et al., Did Ranches and Slaughterhouses Respond to Zero-Deforestation
Agreements in the Brazilian Amazon?, 9 CONSERVATION LETTERS 32 (Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Gibbs
II]; NEW YORK DECLARATION ON FORESTS, Protecting and restoring forests: A Story of Large
Commitments yet Limited Progress, Five-Year Assesment Report 16 (2019) (“There is evidence that
sector-wide approaches lead to a reduction in deforestation”).
317. Polain de Warouz et al., supra note 227, at 188–189.
318. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 153.
319. Id.
320. These trade associations are the Brazilian Association of Cereal Exporters and the Brazilian
Association of Vegetable Oil Industries. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 153.
321. Cameron, supra note 284, at 5.
322. Id. at 5; Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 153.
323. Cameron, supra note 286, at 5.
324. H. K. Gibbs et al., Brazil’s Soy Moratorium, 347 SCIENCE 377, 377 (Jan. 23, 2015).
325. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 262, at 151.
326. Id. at 158; see also Gibbs et al., supra note 324, at 378.
327. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 154-157; see also Alexei Barrionuevo,
Giants in Cattle Industry Agree to Help Fight Deforestation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009),
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characteristics of the cattle industry.328 First, the supply chain is longer for cattle,
which are bred, calved, and fattened on one or more farms, then sold to a direct
supplier, then to a meat packing company, then to retailers.329 Second, there is no
“harvest” season for cattle;330 most are slaughtered after moving among several
farms.331 Third, the cattle industry is composed of many small farms and
slaughterhouses, and most of the cattle products are sold on Brazil’s large national
market,332 restricting the role of international actors.333
The impact of both SoyM and the Cattle Agreement on deforestation has
been notable. Studies show that these agreements have “incentivized rapid change in
[supplier] behavior related to deforestation”334 and “dramatically decreased” land
deforested by these suppliers.335 The Cattle Agreement decreased the industry’s
deforestation by 32 percent,336 and SoyM reduced “soybean expansion over
forestlands . . . from around 30% before the moratorium to 1% after it.”337 The
consensus is that these agreements are “effective mechanisms to reduce deforestation
for major export commodities on private lands.”338
However, exposed loopholes in the deals allow for leakage of deforestation
into other geographical areas or industries.339 In the Cattle Agreement, difficulty with
monitoring compliance prompted Greenpeace to abandon the agreement with regard
to one of the three meat packers in 2017: JBS had been discovered buying thousands
of cattle from an illegally deforested area.340
Even while their impact may be less than initially proposed,341 these
initiatives have verifiably “contributed to the reduction of illegal deforestation in
their supply chains.”342 Their proven success is notable among international
initiatives.

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/world/americas/07deforest.html [hereinafter Giants in Cattle
Industry].
328. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 154.
329. Id. (in contrast, the soybean supply chain is farms to trade associations to retailers); Polain de
Warouz et al., supra note 227, at 191.
330. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 154.
331. Id. at 154, 157.
332. Polain de Warouz et al., supra note 227, at 191 (“80% of Brazilian beef production goes to
domestic markets.”).
333. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 157.
334. Gibbs II, supra note 316, at 38.
335. Gibbs et al., supra note 324, at 377.
336. Gibbs II, supra note 316, at 36.
337. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche & Lui, supra note 261, at 156.
338. Polain de Qarouz et al., supra note 227, at 188, 189.
339. Henders et al., supra note 36, at 11.
340. Dom Phillips, Meat Company Faces Heat Over ‘Cattle Laundering’ In Amazon Supply Chain,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/feb/20/meatcompany-faces-heat-over-cattle-laundering-in-amazon-supply-chain.
341. Sue Branford & Maurício Torres, Amazon Soy Moratorium: Defeating Deforestation or
Greenwash Diversion?, MONGABAY (Mar. 8, 2017), https://news.mongabay.com/2017/03/amazon-soymoratorium-defeating-deforestation-or-greenwash-diversion/.
342. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche & Lui, supra note 261, at 158.
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Amazon Region Protected Areas Program

One of the simplest multi-stakeholder initiatives, the Amazon Region
Protected Areas Program (“ARPA”) conserves land within the Amazon as parks and
reserves.343 Launched in 2002, ARPA is a partnership among Brazil, the Brazilian
Biodiversity Fund (“FUNBIO”), Germany, the Global Environment Facility, the
World Bank, and the World Wildlife Foundation.344
ARPA facilitates the transfer of funds from donors to FUNBIO, a private
non-profit, which then disburses money to Brazilian environmental agencies.345 One
of the most innovative features is ARPA’s conjoined accounts.346 These accounts
enable FUNBIO to circumvent Brazilian bureaucracy and transfer funds directly to
protected area managers, increasing efficiency and ensuring that the government
does not divert resources.347
By 2017, ARPA had expanded to protect 48 percent of the Amazon biome
in Brazil.348 Incredibly, the “expansion of [protected areas] in the Brazilian
Amazon . . . contributed to a 75% decrease in deforestation . . . from 2004–2009.”349
While some deforestation still occurs within ARPA designated units,350 these

343. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, AMAZON REGION PROTECTED AREAS PROGRAM (Jan. 2018),
https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/Arpa_GEF%202018_22.01.18-v2.pdf.
344. Establishing Protected Areas Across the Amazon, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
https://wwf.panda.org/discover/knowledge_hub/where_we_work/amazon/vision_amazon/models/amazo
n_protected_areas/establishment/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). Protected areas include indigenous
reserves, “parks, biological reserves, ecological stations, natural heritage reserves, wildlife refuges[,] . . .
production forests, extractive reserves, sustainable development reserves, environmental protection areas,
and private natural heritage reserves.” Robert Walker et al., Protecting the Amazon with Protected Areas,
106 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 10582, 10582 (June 30, 2009) (citing to Brazilian Law 9985, July 18,
2000 and Decree 4340, Aug. 2002).
345. Amazon
Region
Protected
Areas
(GEF),
WORLD
BANK,
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P058503 (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
346. WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON A GRANT FROM THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TRUST FUND IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 30 MILLION TO THE FUNDO
BRASILERIO PARA A BIODIVERSIDADE (FUNBIO) FOR AN AMAZON REGION PROTECTED AREAS PROJECT
(June 22, 2009), accessed at http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/785201468229178280/
pdf/ICR11260P058501IC0disclosed08131091.pdf.
347. Id.; The conjoined account solution “gives protected areas’ site managers small amounts of cash.
‘The resources help them do small things which have a great impact, such as buying gasoline for
enforcement work without having to wait for the government to give them the fuel.’” Carlos Augusto,
Brazil: Government and Communities Work Together to Protect the Amazon Rainforest, WORLD BANK
(Oct. 17, 2012), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/10/17/ARPA-program-protectedareas-Amazon-results-challenges.
348. Kauano et al., supra note 54, at 1.
349. Britaldo Soares-Filho et al., Role of Brazilian Amazon Protected Areas in Climate Change
Mitigation, 107 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10821, 10821 (June 15, 2010); see also Cabral, Saito, Pereira,
& Laques, supra note 348, at 101.
350. Rhett A. Butler, Protected Areas Cover 44% of the Brazilian Amazon, MONGABAY (Apr. 20,
2011), https://news.mongabay.com/2011/04/protected-areas-cover-44-of-the-brazilian-amazon/ (noting
that deforestation still occurs within protected areas, with 4,712 square miles of forest lost between 1998
and 2009); Cabral, Saito, Pereira, & Laques, supra note 348, at 101.
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protected areas have “effectively halted the expansion of agricultural frontiers and
prevented deforestation on an unprecedented scale.”351
From the perspective of sovereignty, the program has been criticized as “a
new form of colonialism, an open conspiracy in which economic and financial
interests . . . block the development of Brazil and the Amazon region.”352 This
description of the coordination of international funds to support a program enshrined
in Brazil’s democratically-created law may seem outlandish, but it is a widely held
view in Brazil.353 This suggests that while the program is hugely successful at
preventing deforestation, it has a reputational image that may make it vulnerable
politically.
In summary, multi-stakeholder initiatives are incredibly diverse in terms of
participants, programmatic structure, strategic focus, and efficacy at reducing
deforestation. Still, important lessons can be distilled. First, a failure to enable
transparency and monitoring can be fatal to an initiative’s effectiveness, and
mechanisms for ensuring accountability are vital. Initiatives that strategically adjust
incentives for participation, adhere to standards, effectively monitor actions,
coordinate with the Brazilian federal government, and hold actors accountable to
reduce deforestation are effective, as are programs that focus on conserving specific
geographic areas. SoyM and ARPA are the most effective multi-stakeholder
mechanisms, reducing deforestation within their target industries or areas by 34
percent and 75 percent, respectively.
C.

Grassroots Activism

Grassroots activism is a “type of movement or campaign that attempts to
mobilize individuals to take some action to influence an outcome, often of a political
nature.”354 Unlike the other international mechanisms discussed supra, these are
“bottom-up initiatives” rather than top-down, and typically involve NGOs in
organizing or supporting roles.355 There is a long history of grassroots activism in
the Brazilian Amazon, beginning in the 1950s and blossoming into an international
force in the 1980s.356 By then, deforestation was proceeding at a breathtaking speed:
at the end of the decade, “10% of the whole Amazon rainforest had disappeared.”357
As Brazilian and Indigenous labor and environmental activists rose up in response,358
351. Stephan Schwartzman et al., Social Movements and Large-Scale Tropical Forest Protection on
the Amazon Frontier, 19 J. ENV’T & DEV. 274, 278 (2010); see also Walker, supra note 344; Alexander
Pfaff et al., Protected Areas’ Impacts on Brazilian Amazon Deforestation, PLOS ONE 1, 15 (2015).
352. Rohter, supra note 98.
353. Id.
354. Grassroots, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/grassroots (last visited Oct. 3,
2020).
355. See Skaidrė Žičkienė, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY IN HIGHER EDUC., Grassroots
Activism and Sustainable Development (Walter Leal Filho ed., living ed. 2019).
356. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 90.
357. Le Tourneau, supra note 28.
358. See generally, REVKIN, supra note 33; see also BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 90. In 1992, there
were 100 Brazilian environmental groups in the Amazon. Elizabeth Heilman Brooke, As Forests Fall,
Environmental
Movement
Rises
in
Brazil,
N.Y
TIMES
(June
2,
1992),
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/02/news/as-forests-fall-environmental-movement-rises-inbrazil.html. This wealth of groups enabled international actors to get involved. Id.
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activists worldwide followed in support of the movement against deforestation.359
The activism can be grouped into two categories based on the activists’ target:
corporations through consumer pressure or Brazil’s government through political
pressure.
1.

Consumer Pressure

In the 1980s, news coverage of large wildfires in Brazil, the assassination
of the famous Brazilian activist Chico Mendes, and increased nature programming
on television “fueled a rising popular upsurge of support for taking action to save the
world’s forests.”360 Consumers, realizing the power of their purchasing decisions,
started organizing boycotts and pressuring corporations to remove deforestation
from their supply chains.361
Multi-national corporations were alarmed. Concerned about the value of
their brands,362 they responded with the now ubiquitous triple bottom line corporate
stance, performatively incorporating environmental sustainability into the
corporation’s main measure of success.363 Fear of being targeted by a consumer
activism campaign also prompted self- and co-regulatory initiatives such as
certifications.364 These certification schemes in turn gave consumers a tangible
“ask,” such as demanding government bodies require FSC-certified lumber in
building contracts.365 By the mid-2000s, as public concern heightened about the role
of deforestation in greenhouse gas emissions,366 global brands tried a third response:
voluntary zero deforestation commitments such as the Consumer Goods Forum’s
Deforestation Resolution.367

359. BARBOSA, supra note 94, at 91.
360. David Kaimowitz, Forestry Assistance and Tropical Deforestation: Why the Public Doesn’t Get
What It Pays For, 2 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 225, 226 (2000).
361. CAROLINE HELDMAN, PROTEST POLITICS IN THE MARKETPLACE: CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN THE
CORPORATE AGE 59 (2017); Brendan Borrell, What Ever Happened to the Amazon Rain Forest? Did We
Save It Or What? SLATE (Nov. 3, 2009), https://slate.com/technology/2009/11/what-ever-happened-tothe-amazon-rain-forest-did-we-save-it.html.
362. See Tarun Banerjee & Benjamin Case, The Leverage of Protest: Market, Media, and Reputational
Disruption in Social Movement Success, 35 SOCIO. F. 95, 98–99 (2020); Tharic Pires Dias Galuchi et al.,
Management of Socioenvironmental Factors of Reputational Risk in the Beef Supply Chain in the
Brazilian Amazon Region, 22 INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 155, 159 (2019) (“The
competitiveness of supply chains is linked to the ability of their agents to meet consumer and stakeholder
expectations. Failure of some agents in a supply chain to satisfy this public can cause a negative reaction
that affects the entire chain’s reputation in a spill over effect. This new reality has led food corporations
to adopt more sustainable production practices.” (citations omitted)).
363. Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 3.
364. Id.; See also supra Part II.B.1.
365. See, e.g., Jill P. Capuzzo, Rainforest Politics Strides Onto the Boardwalk, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/24mainnj.html.
366. Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 1. See also Christianna Parr et al., The Amazon Isn’t the
Only Forest That’s Burning. Can Consumer Pressure Stop the Destruction?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/14/amazon-isnt-only-forest-thats-burning-canconsumer-pressure-stop-destruction/; Ylan Q. Mui, Wal-Mart Extends its Influence to Washington,
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2007.
367. Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 1. See supra Part II.B.2. Most of these corporate
responses have “fail[ed] to deliver strong enough results.” Parr et. al., supra note 368.
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Some consumer pressure has been more brazen. Between 2005 and 2009,
Greenpeace published two scathing reports highlighting the devastating
deforestation perpetrated by soy farming and cattle ranching in the Amazon. Its first
report spurred “public campaigns and protests” against soy purchasers and
retailers.368 This consumer activism “pushed supermarket chains and food companies
such as McDonald’s to declare a boycott on the purchase of illegally farmed soy[]”
due to fear of reputational damage.369 These boycotts, in turn, led to SoyM.370
Greenpeace’s sequel report, Slaughtering the Amazon,371 alleged certain
“global brands [were] silent partners to crime”372 and generated public outcry,
“result[ing] in retailers and importers immediately bann[ing] Brazilian beef
imports.”373 Exporters panicked about losing market share,374 and within months,
Brazil’s four largest meatpacking corporations signed the Cattle Agreement.375
Other less coordinated activism has focused pressure on international
corporations to reduce their demand for deforestation in Brazil. In 2019, following
the outcry over the Brazilian Amazon fires in the press,376 on social media,377 and in
world-wide public demonstrations,378 “the world’s second-biggest fashion retailer”
H&M, as well as international brands including The North Face and Timberland,
announced they would stop purchasing leather from Brazil.379 Other companies
declared they would stop buying Brazilian soy.380 A major European investment firm
dropped one of Brazil’s largest meatpackers—the same corporation that had been

368. Dos Santos Massoca et al., supra note 261, at 152–53.
369. Jeff Tollefson, Stopping Deforestation: Battle for the Amazon, 520 NATURE 20, 21 (Apr. 2, 2015);
Marc Kaufman, New Allies on the Amazon, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2007),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/23/AR2007042301903.html.
370. Le Tourneau, supra note 28. See also Kaufman, supra note 369.
371. GREENPEACE, SLAUGHTERING THE AMAZON (2009), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wpcontent/uploads/legacy/Global/usa/planet3/PDFs/slaughtering-the-amazon-part-1.pdf.
372. Id. at iv.
373. Luciana M. Vieira et al., Multi-Stakeholder Initiative For Sustainable Beef Production Standards,
in A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO MANAGING FOOD 8 (Adam Lindgreen et al., eds., 2017); Giants in
Cattle Industry, supra note 327.
374. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche, & Lui, supra note 261, at 153.
375. Polain de Warouz et al., supra note 227, at 190.
376. E.g., Roland Hughes, Amazon Fires: What’s the Latest in Brazil? BBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49971563; Moriyama & Sandy, supra note 57; Colin
Dwyer, Tens of Thousands of Fires Ravage Brazilian Amazon, Where Deforestation Has Spiked, NPR
(Aug. 21, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/753140642/tens-of-thousands-of-fires-ravagebrazilian-amazon-where-deforestation-has-spike.
377. E.g., Hollingsworth, supra note 5; Campbell, supra note 5.
378. E.g., Tom Phillips & Dom Phillips, Protesters Besiege Brazilian Embassies Worldwide Over
Amazon Fires, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/23/brazilprotests-amazon-bolsonaro-failure-protect.
379. Manuela Andreoni & Sapna Maheshwari, Is Brazilian Leather Out of Fashion? H&M Stops
Buying Over Amazon Fires, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/
world/americas/h-m-leather-brazil-amazon-fires.html.
380. Glenn Hurowitz, Opinion, How Pressuring Corporations Can Save the Amazon from
Destruction, YALE ENV’T 360 (Sept. 10, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-pressuringcorporations-can-save-the-amazon-from-destruction.
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expelled from the Cattle Agreement—”over the company’s role in deforestation.”381
Six other European investment firms followed, declaring their intent to “divest from
beef producers, grains traders and even government bonds in Brazil.”382 Germany
passed a “due diligence law on supply chains” that enables it to hold businesses
accountable for deforestation by their suppliers.383 Consumers also poured hundreds
of thousands of dollars in donations to NGOs.384
However, cattle producers in Brazil have been remarkably resilient to
consumer pressure.385 While their buyers—fast food chains and supermarkets—have
made deforestation commitments and have expressed their concern to the beef
suppliers, their “gentle urging just isn’t enough.”386 The meatpackers’ incentive to
change is lacking when, “for all their handwringing, [customers] ke[ep] buying
billions of dollars in products.”387 Still, the pressure generated by the 2019 outcry
may have finally persuaded one major Brazilian cattle supplier to change: in
September 2020, JBS announced “it plans to combat destruction in the Amazon by
monitoring its entire supply chain for deforestation by 2025.”388
2.

Political Pressure

International influence in Brazilian politics promoting Amazonian
conservation began proceeding the 1972 Stockholm Conference.389 There,
“international pressure persuaded the Brazilian dictatorial government to create
381. Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, Under Pressure, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Forced to Fight
Deforestation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/01/world/americas/Brazil-amazon-deforestation-bolsonaro.html
[hereinafter Under Pressure].
382. Tom Phillips, Trillion-dollar Investors Warn Brazil Over ‘Dismantling’ of Environmental
Policies,
GUARDIAN
(June
23,
2020
11:01
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jun/23/trillion-dollar-investors-warn-brazil-overdismantling-of-environmental-policies.
383. Dom Phillips, Tesco Urged to Ditch Meat Company Over Alleged Links to Amazon Deforestation,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/aug/05/tesco-urged-toditch-meat-company-over-alleged-links-to-amazon-deforestation; Jenny Gesley, Germany: New Law
Obligates Companies to Establish Due Diligence Procedures in Global Supply Chains to Safeguard
Human Rights and the Environment, L. LIBR. CONG. (2021), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legalmonitor/2021-08-17/germany-new-law-obligates-companies-to-establish-due-diligence-procedures-inglobal-supply-chains-to-safeguard-human-rights-and-the-environment/.
384. Allie Nawrat, Have You Heard The Amazon Is On Fire? The Power Of Social Media In
Awareness Raising, VERDICT (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.verdict.co.uk/amazon-fires-socialmedia/(considering the broader NGO community, “the total charitable donations, particularly through
Leonardo diCaprio’s partnership with the Earth Alliance, probably now matches the G7’s commitment”
of $22 million).
385. Hurowitz, supra note 380.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Roberto Samora, Brazil’s JBS Vows to Monitor Deforestation Through Whole Cattle Supply
Chain, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jbs-amazon/brazils-jbs-vows-tomonitor-deforestation-through-whole-cattle-supply-chain-idUSKCN26E20I; Dom Philips, Brazil Meat
Giant JBS Pledges to Axe Suppliers Linked to Deforestation, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/23/brazil-meat-giant-jbs-pledges-to-axe-supplierslinked-to-deforestation.
389. Nicolle & Leroy, supra note 12, at 103.
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dedicated environmental institutions”—agencies that would designate the first
Amazon protected areas.390
As the military rule phased out, increased tolerance for political dissidence
enabled social movements to gain strength.391 In the 1980s, Brazilian activist Chico
Mendes organized the Peoples of the Forest movement to advocate against
commercial deforestation.392 Sponsored by international NGOs, Mendes and other
activists traveled widely and appeared on popular television shows to elevate
concern about the Amazon to a global audience.393 Mendes described NGOs and the
international press as “our biggest assets” because only after their involvement did
Mendes’ movement “start[] to get support from the rest of Brazil.”394 Mendes’
international strategy was highly successful. By 1989, federal representatives in the
U.S. were championing the Amazon’s protection.395
Mendes’ strategy has been replicated multiple times over the intervening
thirty years, with varying degrees of success. His method of engaging celebrities to
receive press coverage gives “political leverage to environmentalists and grassroots
organizations” because it keeps international attention on the Amazon.396 For
example, when the Brazilian government initiated a road to Peru in the 1980s,
international celebrities from Phil Collins to Gabriel García Márquez called on the
government to stop, resulting in some gains in conservation measures and at least
temporarily halting the project.397 The Kayapó, an Amazonian Indigenous group,
also applied this strategy in an effort to stop a hydroelectric project in 1989. Six
hundred people, including international NGO activists and the musician Sting,
converged in the area of the proposed dam.398 Just as the Kayapó organizers had
hoped, the highly critical international press coverage shamed the Brazilian
government into shelving the plans for the dam.399

390. Id.
391. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 2.
392. Kate Evans, Martyr of the Amazon, FOREST NEWS (Nov. 5, 2013),
https://forestsnews.cifor.org/17295/martyr-of-the-amazon-the-legacy-of-chico-mendes?fnl=en
393. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 2; Evans, supra note 394.
394. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 117 (quoting Chico Mendes); see also Nicolle & Leroy, supra note
12, at 104 (“The Brazilian case is symbolic of a multiscale coalition, as it connected very local actors,
who were defending their way of life against direct threats, and actors on the international scene, mobilized
in favour [sic] of the protection of Amazonia.”).
395. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
396. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 3.
397. Borrell, supra note 361.
398. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 111–112; Terrence Turner, The Role of Indigenous Peoples in the
Environmental Crisis: The Example of the Kayapo of the Brazilian Amazon, 36 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY &
MED. 526, 540 (1993); see also Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 285.
399. Terence Turner, Megaron Txukarramãe, & Luis Carlos, Kayapó Set To Fight Massive Dam
Project, SURVIVAL INT’L (Apr. 27, 2006), https://www.survivalinternational.org/news/1577. This protest
prompted the pop star Sting to found the Rainforest Foundation. Elzio Barreto, Brazil Should Hear
Amazon Indians on Dam: Sting, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazilamazon-sting/brazil-should-hear-amazon-indians-on-dam-sting-idUSTRE5AL15C20091122. After that
success, the activist appetite for on-the-ground protests grew, and in 2002 an Amazon dam protest drew
over 2,000. Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 285.
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As international criticism toward Brazil continued to rise toward the end of
the century, then-President José Sarney “reacted with nationalistic belligerence.”400
But, due to the country’s dependence on foreign investments,401 the federal
government implemented Program Nossa Natureza.402 Nossa Natureza eliminated
tax incentives for development in the rainforest, created a unified environmental
agency, and “enacted stiff penalties for illegal burnings,” contributing to the
reduction of the deforestation rate in the early 1990s.403 Through the 2000s and
2010s, local and Indigenous activists continued to implement Mendes’ strategy,
holding international demonstrations protesting national policies that would increase
deforestation,404 engaging Greenpeace and other international NGOs, and using the
sway of celebrities such as Sigourney Weaver405 and Arnold Schwarzenegger.406
As media coverage of deforestation grew, so did concern among Global
North residents.407 Through NGOs, they lobbied their governments to provide
financial resources for forest conservation, and the governments obliged with
billions of dollars in official development assistance.408 In tandem within the
international regime, environmental groups implemented a successful campaign to
pressure the World Bank to stop funding projects that increased deforestation.409
Setting their sights on broader policy shifts within Brazil, local activists,
with support from international environmental organizations, also organized around
the creation of forest reserves.410 Brazil’s president obliged and established several
large Indigenous land reservations411 as well as several extractive reserves in the

400. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 8.
401. Id.; see also Nader Nazmi, The Impact of Foreign Capital on the Brazilian Economy, 38 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN 483, 484–489 (1998) (discussing the increase of foreign direct investment from 1945–1990).
402. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 87.
403. Id., at 87–88; see also Kaplan, supra note 15 (attributing the landmark 2004 Action Plan for the
Protection and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon to “pressure from civil society and international
governments”).
404. Jose Pedro Martins, Brazil: Environmentalists and Church Protest Legalization of Fraudulently
Obtained Lands in the Amazon, NOTISUR – S. AM. POL. & ECON. AFFS., Aug. 7, 2009.
405. New Protest Paralyzes Brazil’s Belo Monte Dam Indigenous and Riverbank Communities
Occupy Key Work Camp of Amazon Megaproject, AMAZON WATCH (Mar. 21, 2013)
https://amazonwatch.org/news/2013/0321-new-protest-paralyzes-brazils-belo-monte-dam; Brazil Dam
Tender Triggers Protest, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 21, 2010), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/4/21/brazildam-tender-triggers-protest; Background Briefing: Belo Monte Dam, SURVIVAL INT’L,
https://www.survivalinternational.org/about/belo-monte-dam (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
406. Maximo Anderson & Aaron Vincent Elkaim, Belo Monte Legacy, MONGABAY (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://news.mongabay.com/2018/02/belo-monte-legacy-harm-from-amazon-dam-didnt-end-withconstruction/.
407. Kaimowitz, supra note 360, at 226.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 226–227; accord Brody, supra note 88.
410. Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 287; see also Nicolle & Leroy, supra note 12, at 107 (“in
Brazil, the coalitions which defended the indigenous population’s rights, were well structured with
correspondents based on the local to the international level, and mobilised NGOs, researchers, and the
media.”).
411. Two were the size of Switzerland and Portugal. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 121.
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Amazon.412 Indigenous groups have zealously guarded these lands from illegal
development.413 Continued pressure leading up to the World Conference on
Sustainable Development in 2002 led Brazil to announce ARPA.414 Under the new
program, activists successfully advocated for 5.6 million hectare reserves
strategically positioned to “imped[e] the advance of, the most rapidly expanding
agricultur[al] frontier in the Amazon.”415 Researchers have postulated that without
the international pressure, “the process [of demarcation] may not have occurred,”416
and further that activism is behind the creation and continued existence of “the
preponderance” of protected areas in the Amazon.417
Most recently, in 2019, global activists, leaders, and organizations
demonstrated418 and made public statements419 pressuring President Bolsonaro’s
government to put out the staggering number of fires ablaze in the Amazon.420
Additionally, investors used their clout, with “more than two dozen financial
institutions that collectively control some $3.7 billion in assets . . . warning the
Brazilian government . . . that investors were steering away from countries that are
accelerating the degradation of ecosystems.”421 Because Brazil benefits from tens of
billions of dollars in foreign direct investment,422 the threat of losing that investment
creates extraordinary pressure on the government to respond to investor concerns.
The overwhelming international criticism led the president to cave,423 “ban[ning]

412. Id. at 8; Raimundo Cláudio Gomes Maciel et al., The “Chico Mendes” Extractive Reserve and
Land Governance in the Amazon: Some Lessons from the Two Last Decades, 223 J. ENV’T MGMT. 403,
404 (2018).
413. Salomé Gómez-Upegui, The Amazon Rainforest’s Most Dogged Defenders Are in Peril, VOX
(Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.vox.com/down-to-earth/22641038/indigenous-forest-guardians-brazilguajajara.
414. Pol’y Dep’t for External Rel., Challenges for Environmental and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in
the Amazon Region, at 16, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE603.488) (June 2020). See supra Part II.B.4; see also
News Advisory, Brazilian Government Announces Creation Of New Protected Areas In the Amazon
Region; Visiting Official to Announce Conservation, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 5, 2002.
415. Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 275; see generally id.
416. BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 123; accord Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 275; Nicolle &
Leroy, supra note 12, at 107.
417. Schwartzman et al., supra note 351, at 275; see also Jusys, supra note 39, at 2.
418. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amazon Fires Inspire Global Day of Action to Hold Politicians
and Corporations Accountable (Sept. 10, 2019), https://amazonwatch.org/news/2019/0910-amazon-firesinspire-global-day-of-action.
419. Sophia Foggin, What World Leaders Are Saying About The Forest Fires in the Amazon, LATIN
AM. REPORTS (Aug. 23, 2019), https://latinamericareports.com/what-world-leaders-are-saying-about-theforest-fires-in-the-amazon/2961/.
420. See
Burns,
NATIONAL
INSTITUTE
FOR
SPACE
RESEARCH,
http://queimadas.dgi.inpe.br/queimadas/portal-static/situacao-atual/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (showing
number of fires in Brazil in 2019 up 75% from 2018).
421. Under Pressure, supra note 381; see also Tom Phillips, Trillion-dollar Investors Warn Brazil
Over
‘Dismantling’
of
Environmental
Policies,
GUARDIAN
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jun/23/trillion-dollar-investors-warn-brazil-overdismantling-of-environmental-policies.
422. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, current US$) – Brazil, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BR (last
visited Oct. 19, 2020).
423. Under Pressure, supra note 381.
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Amazon fires by decree, deploy[ing] the army to combat illegal loggers, set[ting] up
a . . . Amazonian Council, and propos[ing] a scheme where the private sector would
pay to preserve parts of the rainforest.”424
Significantly, environmental activism in Brazil has stirred concerns over
sovereignty since the 1980s.425 Calls for forest conservation “were viewed as using
the environment . . . as an excuse to internationalize the region, thus giving the rich
countries control over its vast natural resources.”426 Unsurprisingly, this rhetoric is
spouted by President Bolsonaro to this day.427 During the international outcry over
the increased forest fires in 2019, Bolsonaro baselessly suggested that environmental
groups had started the fires.428 As this fear of corrupt motives behind environmental
activism in the Amazon seems likely to persist, transparency is crucial.429 However,
as long as Brazil seeks to participate in international markets and among international
institutions, sovereignty concerns are unlikely to be determinative when the
Brazilian government faces international pressure.
In summary, while sporadic, international activism has played a clear role
in catalyzing responsible actors to reduce deforestation, with a major victory in
compelling the establishment of designated protected areas in the Amazon.430
However, activism often lacks the attention span to hold actors accountable for their
refusal or failure to follow through on conservation commitments and is often
pacified with lackluster voluntary commitments. Such initiatives have been most
successful at spurring successful deforestation prevention measures when
coordinated by an NGO that has a specific solution for corporations and governments
to implement.
III.

LESSONS LEARNED

The successes and failures of the initiatives discussed in Part II provide
insight and evidence into which actions prevent Amazonian deforestation. Namely,
effective initiatives (A) target influential sectors and actors; (B) respect Brazil’s
sovereignty; (C) are specific in their goals and procedures; (D) have a singular goal
of forest conservation, (E) enable monitoring; (F) include accountability
mechanisms; and (G) are well-funded.
424. Oliver Stuenkel, Opinion, International Pressure Can Save the Amazon from Bolsonaro,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/0f97c674-b7aa-4ec4-8fa188b810bc3dc7. Unfortunately, but predictably, President Bolsonaro’s concessions appear largely
performative. See, e.g., Fiona Harvey & Dom Phillips, A Fifth of Brazilian Soy in Europe is Result of
Deforestation, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 16, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/16/afifth-of-brazilian-soy-in-europe-is-result-of-deforestation-amazon-jair-bolsonaro.
425. See BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 83–136.
426. See id. at 83.
427. Jonathan Watts, Jair Bolsonaro Claims NGOs Behind Amazon Forest Fire Surge – But Provides
No Evidence, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/21/jairbolsonaro-accuses-ngos-setting-fire-amazon-rainforest.
428. Id.
429. Consider the backlash as media consumers realized pictures widely shared in 2019 were of forest
fires from previous years. Adrianna Rodriguez, Raising awareness about fires in the Amazon? Share these
photos, not dated stock images, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2019/08/23/amazon-rainforest-fires-some-viral-photos-up-30-years-old/2093922001/.
430. See Nicolle & Leroy, supra note 12, at 107–08.
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Target Influential Sectors and Actors

As discussed in Part I, Brazil’s federal policies and international market
forces are the two factors that best explain deforestation rates in the Brazilian
Amazon.431
1.

International Market Forces: Industries and Actors

Industrial cattle and soy operations are responsible for over 80 percent of
Amazon deforestation.432 International initiatives that target these industries are
vastly more successful at preventing deforestation. As illustrated by the FSC and
ITTO, deforestation prevention efforts that target other industries do not foster
Amazonian conservation for the simple reason that those industries are not causing
Amazonian deforestation.433
Successful initiatives apply pressure to the most responsive part of these
industries’ supply chains: the large downstream corporations. These actors are the
most likely to be concerned with their reputation because they are “more visible to
stakeholders,”434 or they are susceptible to the secondary impacts of such concern.
These actors also have the power to demand change within the supply chain.435
Consider SoyM, which targets large Brazilian soy industry associations that
trade internationally.436 Due to this international orientation, the associations are
susceptible to the secondary effects of reputational harm. In 2006, when large soy
buyers—including McDonalds and grocery chains—consolidated purchasing power
and demanded deforestation-free soy following Greenpeace’s Eating Up the Amazon
report,437 the associations had to respond. They feared losing market share if they
failed to offer the “hot new” product (deforestation-free soy). These associations had
the power to set and enforce standards among their suppliers. As the direct buyers of
soy from farms, the association’s refusal to purchase soy from out-of-compliance
farms significantly impedes farmers’ ability to market their crop.438 So, the
associations implemented SoyM in 2008, enabling the soy associations to provide
their customers with the desired deforestation-free soy.439 Today, the soy
associations still acknowledge the importance of SoyM’s reputational protection,
warning that ending SoyM “could hurt farmers [by] creating backlash against

431. See supra Part I.A. See Philip Fearnside, Business as Usual, YALE ENV’T 360 (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/business-as-usual-a-resurgence-of-deforestation-in-the-brazilian-amazon;
Lawson, supra note 306, at 114.
432. Drivers of Forest Loss in the Brazilian Amazon, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2017)
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/drivers-forest-loss-brazil-amazon.
433. See supra Part II.B.1, Part II.A.2.
434. Hannes Hofmann, Martin C. Schleper & Constantin Blome, Conflict Minerals and Supply Chain
Due Diligence, 147 J. BUS. ETHICS 115, 116 (2018). See generally Galuchi et al., supra note 365.
435. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche & Lui, supra note 261, at 158.
436. Id. at 153.
437. Dos Santos Massoca et al., supra note 261, at 152–55; Kaufman, supra note 369.
438. See Gibbs et al., supra note 324, at 378.
439. See generally supra notes 367–73 and accompanying text (discussing Greenpeace’s Eating Up
the Amazon report and public outcry).
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Brazilian goods in European markets, where consumers demand more
environmentally sustainable farming.”440
Conversely, many certification schemes—a type of initiative not proven to
be effective at preventing Amazonian deforestation—focus on upstream actors: the
farms or ranches. Farmers and ranchers have little concern about their reputation
because they do not sell directly to consumers and have little power to influence the
actions of their buyers.441 The market penalty for opting out simply is not harsh
enough to incentivize certification.442
Engaging a high percentage of powerful actors helps to effect change,
ensure continuity, and avoid leakage. For example, over 90 percent of Brazilian soy
production is controlled by members of SoyM, compared to around a third of cattle
exports represented in the Cattle Agreement.443 With greater participation within a
target industry, the more incentive smaller suppliers have to comply and ensure their
market access. Broad participation lessens the market opportunity that induces
leakage.444 The failure of most certification schemes and voluntary commitments to
decrease deforestation highlights the importance of near-universal participation.
Selective participation inhibits the effectiveness of such schemes.
Intriguing new developments are supply chain due diligence laws emerging
in Europe.445 These laws “oblige companies to identify, address and remedy aspects
of their value chain (all operation, direct or indirect business relations, investment
chains) that could or do infringe on . . . the environment” to ensure “companies are
held accountable and liable when they [do] harm.”446 In 2021, Indigenous activists
and international environmental organizations sued a European supermarket chain
under France’s due diligence law.447 They allege “systemic violations of . . .
environmental laws in the company’s supply chains” in Brazil, where the company
“sourced cattle from 592 suppliers responsible for at least 50,000 hectares of
deforestation between 2008 and 2020.”448 The plaintiffs are requesting $3.7 million

440. Roberto Samora, Brazil Farmers Push Traders to End Amazon Soy Moratorium (2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-soybeans-moratorium/brazil-farmers-push-traders-to-endamazon-soy-moratorium-idUSKBN1XF2J6.
441. Eisenhammer, supra note 58 (detailing the inability of a Brazilian rancher to remove deforestation
from his position in the supply chain).
442. See supra notes 290–295 (discussion of flaws of certification schemes).
443. Dos Santos Massoca, Delaroche & Lui, supra note 261, at 156.
444. See generally Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302.
445. Simon Jennings, Firms Face Deforestation Laws to Tackle Environmental and Human Rights
Risks in the Amazon, (2021), https://www.aperio-intelligence.com/2021/03/09/firms-face-deforestationlaws-to-tackle-environmental-and-human-rights-risks-in-the-amazon/ ; see also European Union Press
Release, MEPs: Hold Companies Accountable for Harm Caused to People and Planet, (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210122IPR96215/meps-hold-companiesaccountable-for-harm-caused-to-people-and-planet.
446. European Union Press Release, supra note 445.
447. French Supermarket Giant Casino Sued Over Links to Amazon Deforestation, BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, (2021), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latestnews/french-supermarket-giant-casino-sued-over-links-to-amazon-deforestation/.
448. Aude Mazoue, Indigenous Groups Sue French Retailer over Destruction of Amazon Rainforest,
FRANCE24 (2021), https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20210304-indigenous-groups-sue-frenchretailer-over-destruction-of-amazon-rainforest.
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in damages.449 Already, global business associations are responding, seeking to urge
and facilitate their Brazilian members to comply with these laws to prevent further
litigation.450 Such national-level laws could prove an effective tool in targeting
international industries responsible for the bulk of deforestation.
2.

Federal Policies: Governing Bodies and Actors

Political strategies that target the Brazilian federal government are more
effective than those that focus on subnational governments. The federal government
has demonstrated its power to influence deforestation numerous times: its adoption
and expansion of protected areas,451 its strict enforcement of environmental policies
in the early 2000s,452 its participation in SoyM and the Cattle Agreement,453 and its
deployment of the military and prohibition on fires during the dry season in 2019.454
With the current pro-economic growth stance of the federal administration,
many international actors are turning their focus on subnational entities rather than
attempting to negotiate with President Bolsonaro.455 However, the past 40 years have
demonstrated that efforts that circumvent the entire federal government are not as
effective. For example, protected areas under ARPA that are administered by
subnational governments and Indigenous communities experience more nearby
leakage than nationally-administered protected areas.456 Additionally, the voluntary
REDD+ emission trading projects administered by subnational governments and
Indigenous communities were unable to protect the forests sold as carbon credits due
to limited capacity.457 While Indigenous groups and state governments within Brazil
are crucial defenders of forest conservation, they lack the resources—labor, capital,
and technology—and jurisdiction to control both legal and illegal deforestation. This
capacity issue is compounded when the federal government itself paves the way for
deforestation activities.458
Conversely, deforestation prevention efforts involving the federal
government, such as the Amazon Fund, nationally-administered ARPA units, and to
some extent SoyM and the Cattle Agreement have proven effective because the
449. Id.
450. The Changing Business and Human Rights Legal Landscape Means for Businesses in Brazil,
WORLD
BUSINESS
COUNCIL
FOR
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
(2021),
https://www.wbcsd.org/Programs/People-and-Society/Tackling-Inequality/News/What-the-changingbusiness-and-human-rights-legal-landscape-means-for-businesses-in-Brazil.
451. See supra notes 341–45, 410–19 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 48–51.
453. See supra Part II.B.3.
454. Under Pressure, supra note 381.
455. See, e.g., Bruno Vander Velde, France Backs Bold New Pact to Save Amazon,
CONSERVATION.ORG (2019), https://www.conservation.org/blog/france-backs-bold-new-pact-to-saveamazon (describing France’s pledge of $100 million to the pact, and Conservation International’s
additional $20 million—noting that it would go directly to “indigenous peoples and civil society” rather
than the governments).
456. Diego Herrera et al., Impacts of Protected Areas Vary with the Level Of Government, PNAS
(2019), https://www.pnas.org/content/116/30/14916. For a definition of leakage, see supra text
accompanying footnote 227.
457. See supra Part II.A.5.
458. Gómez-Upegui, supra note 413.
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federal government has the resources and authority to administer and enforce such
initiatives. Further, a federal program is less prone to suffering geographical leakage
in the same way a program within a subnational jurisdiction might. Negotiating with
the federal government and securing its participation—or at least its non-defiance—
is critical for successful initiatives.
B.

Respect Brazil’s Sovereignty

International initiatives that respect Brazilian sovereignty are most
successful at preventing deforestation. This is because the lasting scars of
colonization and the fear of the “internationalization” of the Amazon persist in the
national psyche:459 around 60 percent of Brazilians “distrust” environmental
NGOs.460
Effective deforestation strategies either reserve Brazil managerial authority
or support Brazilian laws and legislation while contributing funding. For example,
international contributors to the Amazon Fund do not dictate how the funds are used,
and Brazil has autonomy to spend the money it earns as it deems fit.461 ARPA is
another example: while foreign interests directly support conservation efforts that
“lock up” areas from commercial exploitation, it has survived for 18 years because
it supports a democratically enshrined federal law.462
Brazil’s continuing engagement in PCAB highlights the importance of
program design and its rhetorical framework. Through PCAB, a foreign government
invests financially in Brazil’s protected areas while it also lobbies for the political
protection of such areas through new laws.463 By framing PCAB as a “strategic
partnership” in which the U.S. supports Brazil’s protected land, it does not ignite
Brazil’s sovereignty concerns. Similarly, in 2019, Bolsonaro proposed “a scheme
where the private sector would pay to preserve parts of the rainforest,” showing his
openness to foreign-supported conservation when Brazil remains in control of the
program and adequate funding is present.464
By contrast, initiatives that appear to infringe too severely on Brazil’s
sovereignty are dead on arrival. For example, Brazil has refused to engage in carbon
emission trading with forest conservation credits because to sell such credits would
directly enable foreign actors to control land within Brazil.465 The same forces were
at play when then-U.S.-presidential candidate Biden offered $20 billion for Brazil to
“stop tearing down the forest” and suggested there would be “significant economic
consequences” if Brazil did not end deforestation.466 This political strong-arming
was not well received by a country that places heightened importance on its

459. See generally Furriela, supra note 8.
460. Rohter, supra note 98 (“Winning the battle for Brazilian public opinion is crucial to any global
effort to preserve the environment.”).
461. See supra Part II.A.5.
462. See Walker et al., supra note 344, at 10582 (discussing ARPA’s legal framework).
463. See supra Part II.A.1.
464. Stuenkel, supra note 424.
465. See generally SEYMOUR & BUSCH, supra note 217.
466. Flora Charner & Ivana Kottasová, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Rejects Biden’s Offer of $20 Billion To
Protect The Amazon, CNN (Sept. 30,2020) https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/americas/brazil-bolsonarobiden-amazon-intl/index.html.
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sovereignty. It backfired, with Bolsonaro labeling it a “bribe,” a “threat,” and
refusing it.467 Thus, international action that supports Brazilian-led efforts to protect
the Amazon are more successful than those that threaten Brazil’s sovereignty.
C.

Increase Specificity

Forest conservation initiatives that include specific outcomes and processes
are more successful at reducing deforestation. Lack of specificity in treaties,
agreements, and certification schemes inhibits their success. For example, in the
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation member states pledge to “maintain the ecological
balance within the region and preserve the species” without defining what that
entails.468 Similarly, voluntary corporate commitments and certification schemes
often fail to define “zero-deforestation” or “acceptable deforestation,” contributing
to a lack of meaningful changes in procurement guidelines as well as deceptive
advertising.469
When international initiatives set specific goals for deforestation
prevention, deforestation reduction is more likely to follow. Examples of concrete
and workable goals include SoyM—a moratorium on soy grown on land deforested
after 2008—and the Paris Agreement, in which Brazil committed “to achieve, in the
Brazilian Amazonia, zero illegal deforestation by 2030.”470 The Paris Agreement
lacks an enforcement mechanism,471 illustrating the importance of its specificity: it
is clear to non-participants when an actor is out of compliance. The Consumer Good
Forum’s pledge for deforestation-free supply chains by 2020 472 is similar: while the
voluntary commitment lacked other significant details, the inclusion of a deadline
enabled the assessment that it had “abjectly fail[ed].”473 The knowledge that Brazil
is lagging in its Paris commitment and that the Consumer Goods Forum failed
enables other actors to use accountability mechanisms—such as grassroots
activism—to pressure Brazil into compliance or corporations to fulfill their
promise.474
Specificity within agreements is also a characteristic of successful
initiatives. Both SoyM and ARPA are extremely effective at preventing deforestation
in part due to detailed parameters defining what is or is not allowable.475 ARPA
assigns conservation units a designation and the uses permitted within the unit are

467. Id.
468. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, supra note 110, at art. VII.
469. See Do National Strategies, supra note 300, at 582; see also Implementing and Scaling Up the
CGF Zero Net Deforestation Commitment, supra note 304.
470. BRAZIL, INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ACHIEVING THE
OBJECTIVE OF THE U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2015),
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/BRAZIL%20iNDC%20e
nglish%20FINAL.pdf.. Brazil also committed to “restoring and reforesting 12 million hectares of forests
by 2030.” Id.
471. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Apr. 22,
2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
472. See Implementing and Scaling Up the CGF Zero Net Deforestation Commitment, supra note 304.
473. Id.
474. See supra Part II.C.2.
475. See supra Part II.B.3, Part II.B.4.
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enforced accordingly.476 SoyM specified its approval of soy grown on land
considered cleared before 2008 and its prohibition on soy grown on land cleared after
that date.477
Interrelatedly, a lack of specificity prevents effective evaluation. When
actors cannot agree on whether a certain initiative is preventing deforestation or not,
resources are wasted. For example, the voluntary REDD+ projects measured their
success at forest conservation based on an inconsistent baseline.478 Projects boasted
deforestation prevention by cherry-picking the year from which the prevention was
calculated and claiming the drastic reduction in deforestation from 2004 to 2012—
the result of a combination of factors479—as solely the impact of the voluntary
REDD+ projects.480 The lack of specificity resulted in the squandering of 12 years
and millions of dollars spent on carbon credits that did not actually remove carbon
from the atmosphere.481 As a project coordinated by the UNFCC,482 there was a
missed opportunity for setting specific and uniform parameters for measuring
impact.
D.

Singular Forest Conservation Goal

Initiatives are most effective when their goal is zero deforestation, defined
literally as the complete cessation of all new deforestation. Initiatives like SoyM,
ARPA, and the Amazon Fund that focus (or are evaluated) solely on prevention of
deforestation are most successful.483
Several initiatives considered in Part II focus on sustainable forestry
management (ITTO, PPG7, FSC), coupling the goals of economic development and
forest conservation.484 Initiatives with these dual goals have consistently failed to
decrease the rate of deforestation,485 and some may have contributed to increased
deforestation.486 History illustrates that such initiatives evaluate their success by
considering their economic impact rather than any impact on deforestation
prevention.487
Dual-goal initiatives are less successful because most deforestation in the
Amazon is not driven by poverty.488 Instead, 80 percent occurs on large landowners’
476. See generally José Augusto Drummond, José Luiz de Andrade Franco, & Alessandra Bortoni
Ninis, Brazilian Federal Conservation Units, 15 ENV’T & HIST. 463 (2009).
477. See supra note 322.
478. West et al., supra note 218, at 24188.
479. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
480. West et al., supra note 218, at 24188.
481. Id.
482. See supra note 218–222 and accompanying text.
483. See supra Part II.B.
484. For ITTO, see supra Part II.A.3. For the FSC, see supra Part II.B.1. For the PPA, see supra Part
II.A.1.
485. See generally Benno Pokorny, Imme Scholz, & Wil de Jong, REDD+ for the Poor or the Poor
for REDD+?, 18 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 1, 7 (2015) (finding “a rather limited success of the major strategies
to fight environmental destruction and poverty in achieving the twin goals of environmental protection
and local development”).
486. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
487. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
488. See Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 682.
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properties, driven by market forces enabled (or uninhibited) by national policies. 489
Dual-goal initiatives, in their effort to promote economic development, are limited
to focusing on the remaining 20 percent of deforestation. As one study concluded,
“strategies such as those that promote agroforestry among small farmers are likely
to be ineffectual when cattle ranchers with large estates are the principal villains.”490
Experience indicates that initiatives that succeed at reducing deforestation are those
that focus on only that.
Unfortunately, many international actors continue to favor the dual-goal
strategy of tackling deforestation with sustainable development. As discussed above,
PCAB sponsored the Partnership Platform for the Amazon,491 a “collective action
platform”492 supporting start-ups to create “economic models built on legal and
sustainable use of forest products.”493 If history offers any lessons, this sustainable
development approach will likely end up contributing to increased deforestation
through expanded market and forest access.494
E.

Monitoring and Transparency

Monitoring and transparency are crucial components of successful forest
conservation efforts.495 There are two types of monitoring: monitoring pursuant to
an agreement or program and independent monitoring by third parties. Both advance
forest conservation when they are transparent in their data collection methods and
when they share the data publicly.
Initiatives with robust monitoring mechanisms either succeed, allow for
informed recalibration, or support program termination. For example, SoyM hires a
third party to perform annual systematic monitoring via satellite and aerial surveying,
which encourages compliance and enables trust among stakeholders that the
initiative is working.496 Contrast this with the Cattle Agreement, in which the
responsibility for monitoring was designated to the meat-packing companies and
never fully developed497—only 17 percent of direct suppliers to slaughterhouses are
monitored.498
Monitoring completed by third parties, with or without the consent of those
observed, also has a vital role in ensuring forest conservation. Much of the data that
489. Jan Börner et al., supra note 45, at 1280 (finding that “large landowners . . . are the ones doing
most of the deforestation;” “most” being 80 percent).
490. Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia, supra note 23, at 682.
491. 2018 PCAB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 52.
492. Id.
493. Private Sector Engagement: Partnership Platform for the Amazon (PPA), USAID,
https://pcabhub.org/en-us/resources/fact-sheets/ppa-fact-sheet.pdf/view (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
494. For ITTO, see supra Part II.A.2.
495. Ruth DeFries & Doug Morton, The Amazon Is In Flames. But Brazil’s Past Can Show the Path
Forward, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/08/22/amazon-is-flames-brazils-past-can-show-path-forward/.
496. See Gibbs et al., supra note 324, at 377.
497. Dom Phillips, Meat Company Faces Heat Over ‘Cattle Laundering’ In Amazon Supply Chain,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/feb/20/meatcompany-faces-heat-over-cattle-laundering-in-amazon-supply-chain.
498. Breanna Lujan, A Comparison of Supply Chain Tracking Tools for Tropical Forest Commodities
in Brazil, ENV’T DEFENSE FUND 43 (2019).
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allows for this monitoring is produced by Brazil’s National Institute for Space
Research (INPE), which has been monitoring deforestation in the Amazon through
the Satellite Monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon Forest Project (PRODES) since
1988.499 This monitoring and data transparency resulted from inter-state efforts
through ACT, bilateral US-Brazil relations, and UN organizations.500 While these
initiatives may not be able to directly claim deforestation prevention as a result of
their activities, the significance of thirty-two years of monitoring the rainforest
cannot be understated. Long-term monitoring efforts are a crucial component of
evaluating initiatives, determining the causes of deforestation, and enforcing
environmental laws.
Third-party monitoring enabled Greenpeace’s 2006 and 2009 reports—
reports that ignited the public in demanding more sustainable practices from the soy
and cattle industries.501 Additionally, third-party monitoring led Norway and
Germany to reduce their contributions to the Amazon Fund502 and focused the
world’s attention on the fires in the Amazon in 2019.503 In 2017, the government of
Brazil, pursuant to its prosecution agreement negotiated with meat packers to parallel
the Cattle Agreement, noticed that JBS was sourcing thousands of cattle from an
illegally deforested area.504 This monitoring enabled Greenpeace to reflect on the
viability of the Cattle Agreement, which it ultimately suspended with regard to
JBS.505
An intriguing development is California’s endorsed “Tropical Forest
Standard” (TFS) for its existing cap-and-trade program.506 This unconventional
standard would allow California polluters to offset their pollution through the
purchase of forest credits in rainforests such as the Amazon.507 The TFS, attempting
to learn from past emissions trading failures, only allows certified subnational or
national governments to participate in the hopes of decreasing leakage and increasing
transparency.508 The TFS also builds in third-party verification of the tropical
499. PRODES – Amazon, BRAZIL: GENERAL COORDINATION OF EARTH OBSERVATION,
http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes (last visited Dec. 9, 2020).
500. For ACT, see supra Part II.A.1; for US-Brazil, see supra Part II.A.4; for UN organizations, see
supra Part II.A.2.
501. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 369.
502. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
503. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
504. Rodrigo Estrada, Greenpeace Brazil Suspends Negotiations with Cattle Giant JBS, GREENPEACE
(Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/greenpeace-brazil-suspends-negotiations-cattlegiant-jbs/.
505. Id. In 2020, due to rising international pressure from purchasers, JBS announced that it would
spend almost $2 million in environmental actions, including complete supply-chain monitoring by 2025.
Roberto Samora, Brazil’s JBS Vows to Monitor Deforestation Through Whole Cattle Supply Chain,
REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jbs-amazon/brazils-jbs-vows-to-monitordeforestation-through-whole-cattle-supply-chain-idUSKCN26E20I.
506. California Tropical Forest Standard, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/california-tropical-forest-standard (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
507. Julia Rosen, The World Is Watching as California Weighs Controversial Plan to Save Tropical
Forests, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2019-0912/california-tropical-forest-standard (detailing past attempts “fund forest protection through carbon
offsets” and their unintended detrimental consequences).
508. Id.

Summer 2022

DECIPHERING LESSONS FROM THE ASHES

307

offsets.509 Further, it requires certified participants to “insure” offsets with extra
credits, “in case fires or other natural disasters accidentally release carbon that was
stored for offsets.”510 While California has yet to certify any tropical forest
jurisdictions to participate, this standard may “translate . . . voluntary corporate
commitments into hundreds of millions of dollars or more over the next few years to
finance conservation efforts in the Amazon,” finally creating financial incentives that
are stronger than other market forces.511
F.

Accountability Mechanisms

Accountability plays a key role in the success of international initiatives,
providing a substitute for elusive enforcement duties. Accountability mechanisms
penalize an actor’s failure to fulfill its obligation pursuant to an agreement, standard,
or norm. As with monitoring, there are two types of accountability mechanisms:
those relying on outside actors, and those building accountability into the initiative.
When the accountability mechanism relies on outside actors, successful
initiatives require two components. First, they must involve actors who are
susceptible to public accountability. These include institutions and individuals who
are receptive to political and consumer pressure, such as President Bolsonaro, who
eventually deployed fire fighters during the 2019 blazes to preserve his reputation.512
Second, the initiative must be specific enough so the actor’s compliance or
noncompliance is clear.
Both factors are present in initiatives that prevent deforestation. For
example, with ARPA, it is clear when the initiative is failing (there is deforestation
in a protected area), and the actor (the Brazilian government) is susceptible to public
accountability (elections). In 1996, the Brazilian president removed protections from
reserves, thereby enabling deforestation.513 As an elected official, he was held
accountable both nationally and internationally. He was condemned by a multifaceted international campaign involving the G-7 and the World Bank and lost
political capital at home.514 Both components were also present in 2007 when
Greenpeace tracked soy from the deforestation frontier to Cargill and McDonald’s
and confronted McDonald’s with those data.515 Greenpeace was able to hold
McDonald’s accountable to its own policy against using “products that come from
the rainforest” because McDonald’s brand is susceptible to reputational harm

509. California Tropical Forest Standard, Criteria for Assessing Jurisdiction-Scale Programs that
Reduce Emissions from Tropical Deforestation, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., 17,
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic//cc/ghgsectors/tropicalforests/draft_ca_tropical_forest_
standard.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2021).
510. Rosen, supra note 507.
511. Daniel Nepstad, Opinion, How to Help Brazilian Farmers Save the Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/opinion/amazon-deforestation.html.
512. Stuenkel, supra note 424.
513. See BARBOSA, supra note 95, at 9; Terence Turner, Brazilian Presidential Decree 1775 Poses
Threat, CULTURAL SURVIVAL QUARTERLY MAG. (Mar. 1996), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/brazilian-presidential-decree-1775-poses-threat.
514. Id.
515. Kaufman, supra note 369.
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(consumer boycotts) and its failure to adhere to its voluntary commitment was
clear.516
Other successful international initiatives build accountability mechanisms
into the commitment. These initiatives ensure accountability by setting specific
objectives, incorporating monitoring mechanisms, and providing appropriate
incentives and disincentives to participants. Such initiatives include SoyM, which
audits and blocks the sale of crops grown on deforested land, and the Amazon Fund,
which only rewards Brazil after the deforestation reduction has been achieved.
To emphasize the importance of accountability mechanisms, initiatives that
lack them like voluntary corporate commitments, certification schemes, and REDD+
rainforest carbon credits, have been unsuccessful at preventing deforestation. When
these initiatives fail to achieve their goal, they rarely face any ramifications or public
accounting. For example, when the Consumer Goods Forum’s goal to achieve zero
net-deforestation in supply chains by 2020 was resoundingly ineffective,517 it simply
publicized its new deforestation prevention plan: the Forest Positive Coalition of
Action.518 It did not face any consumer backlash. As many of these commitments are
made under the umbrella of a larger association, the companies that claimed the
benefit of the positive press when the commitment was announced were shielded
from the—albeit, scant—negative coverage when the commitment failed to
deliver.519
G.

Adequate Funding

The widespread assumption is that if the rainforest becomes more lucrative
through conservation than by deforestation, commodity-driven deforestation will
cease.520 This means decreasing the relative profitability of deforestation activities—
by increasing the cost of deforestation through fines and restricted market access—
while raising the value of forested land. However, adequate funding from the

516. Id.
517. Catherine Boudreau, Out on a Limb On Deforestation, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/the-long-game/2020/10/06/out-on-limb-deforestation-490527;
Leading Consumer Goods Companies Directly Linked to Deforestation, CDP (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.cdp.net/es/articles/media/leading-consumer-goods-companies-directly-linked-todeforestation-soybean-cattle-paper-palm-oil-risks-potential-threat-to-global-supply-chains#1.
518. Press Release, New Consumer Goods Coalition to Accelerate Systemic Effort to Remove
Deforestation and Forest Degradation from Key Commodity Supply Chains, CONSUMER GOODSFORUM
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.theconsumergoodsforum.com/press_releases/new-consumer-goodscoalition-to-accelerate-systemic-effort-to-remove-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-from-keycommodity-supply-chains/.
519. Every corporation sets its own individual targets and measures of success. In the news coverage,
several corporations were highlighted and allowed to spin the commitments into successes. See Emanuela
Barbiroglio, Deforestation Pledges Are Easy to Make and Easier to Forget About, FORBES (Feb. 14,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emanuelabarbiroglio/2020/02/14/brands-alone-fail-to-makepublicly-available-commitments-against deforestation/?sh=242275896455.
520. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, The Simple Economics of Saving the Amazon Rainforest,
FREAKONOMICS, at 30:15 (July 29, 2020), https://freakonomics.com/podcast/the-simple-economics-ofsaving-the-amazon-rainforest/ (“[F]rom a purely economic perspective, Brazil should be willing to stop
deforestation for $1 to 2 billion per year. The rich nations of the world should be willing to pay up to $40
billion.”); Klafehn, supra note 18, at 983.
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international community has failed to materialize. Forest conservation is not
cheap.521
The Amazon Fund, for example, has had limited success due to an
insufficient amount of funding.522 The Fund channels financial support from
wealthier nations and multinational corporations to Brazil to reward it for forest
conservation, creating a monetary incentive for forest conservation that is, in theory,
higher than market demand for deforestation. However, while many countries
expressed interest in supporting the fund, only two countries and one multi-national
corporation have invested in it over the past decade.523 As deforestation has
continued, the amount invested is clearly inadequate to sufficiently distort the
market.524
The need for adequate funding must be understood as intricately interwoven
with a respect for Brazil’s sovereignty. Therefore, funding for NGOs to purchase
large tracts of rainforest to conserve would not be effective, as it would impinge on
Brazil’s sovereignty. Additionally, one-off, highly publicized funding for Brazil to
enforce its environmental policies during a time of heightened international
condemnation is not effective.525 Instead, such funding puts Brazil in a defensive
position and, in the eyes of Brazilians, incites fears of international interference with
national policy.526 A more productive approach, demonstrated by PCAB, is to quietly
negotiate a deal similar in content but, critically, without public bullying.527
In summary, international institutions that are effective at preventing
deforestation target specific market industries or the national governmental, respect
Brazil’s sovereignty, include specific goals and procedures, focus solely on forest
conservation, are subject to monitoring, include accountability mechanisms, and are
adequately funded.
IV. A STREAMLINED FRAMEWORK FOR AMAZON PROTECTION
Existing international initiatives are not effectively conserving the Brazilian
Amazon, evidenced by the deforestation rate rising since 2012 and its recent, threeyear surge. As the rainforest teeters on the brink of its tipping point, the situation for
521. Motoe Miyamoto, Poverty Reduction Saves Forests Sustainably, 127 WORLD DEV. 1, 2 (2020)
(estimating total cost of protected areas in Brazil to be “approximately US $147 billion”); Felipe de
Figueiredo Silva et al., The Cost of Forest Preservation in the Brazilian Amazon: The “Arc of
Deforestation,” 44 J. OF AGRIC. RESOURCE ECON. 497, 497 (2019); Levitt, supra note 526 (“A hectare of
Amazon land cleared for raising cattle . . . sells for less than $1,000. With a social cost of carbon of $50
per ton of CO2 and the current best estimates of the carbon stored in the Amazon, each hectare of land
preserved as forest is worth over $28,000 based on the carbon alone.”).
522. See supra notes 326–329 and accompanying text.
523. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
524. See supra Part I.A.
525. See Charner & Kottasová, supra note 466.
526. See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Brazil Reject’s G-7’s Offer of $22 Million to Fight Amazon Fires, NPR
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/27/754687137/brazil-rejects-g-7s-offer-of-22-million-tofight-amazon-fires; Simone Preissler Iglesias & Shannon Sims, Bolsonaro Slams Biden’s Plan to Stop
Amazon
Deforestation,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
30,
2020,
8:10
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-30/biden-pledges-to-slow-destruction-of-brazil-samazon-rainforest.
527. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Brazil and for the international community is dire.528 To conserve the Amazon’s
climate change mitigation capacity, the global water cycle, and an incredible amount
of biodiversity, action must be swift and efficacious. The international community
has had over 40 years to experiment with strategies. The lessons from those
experiments now must be integrated into a streamlined framework for the Amazon’s
conservation.
As described in Part II, an astounding number and wide diversity of
initiatives are aimed at this common objective. A new framework that incorporates
the lessons highlighted in Part III can be more effective and efficient at protecting
the Amazon rainforest. Through coordination, cooperation, and built-in redundancy
for emergency situations, the international community can expand and channel
resources into successful or promising initiatives such as SoyM, a new CattleM, the
Amazon Fund, and ARPA, while ceasing and eliminating the enormous bloat of
ineffective actions. The following four recommendations will create a coordinated
and effective international strategy for assisting Brazil to immediately decrease
deforestation.
A.

Double Down on Successful Strategies and Cease Other Activities

SoyM, ARPA, and the Amazon Fund have demonstrated the most proven
success at deforestation prevention and offer promise for scaling up. These initiatives
should be slightly modified, expanded, and supported.529
SoyM should be expanded to cover all soy produced in and near the
Brazilian Amazon and then be replicated for the cattle industry.530 Learning from the
lesson of the 2009 Cattle Agreement, this new “CattleM” must involve a greater
percentage of the actors engaged in the cattle industry (as opposed to the 30 percent
of meat-packers previously committed),531 include a monitoring mechanism that
eliminates cattle laundering,532 and apply to the entire Brazilian Amazon. Drawing
on the successes of SoyM, NGOs and the Brazilian government must be members to
the CattleM to monitor compliance, enforce regulations, and broadcast failures to
consumers. These agreements must remain transparent and facilitate the sharing of

528. Thomas E. Lovejoy & Carlos Nobre, Editorial, Amazon Tipping Point, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Dec.
20, 2019).
529. See generally Daniel Nepstad et al., More Food, More Forests, Fewer Emissions, Better
Livelihoods, 4 CARBON MGMT. 639 (2013).
530. Both SoyM and ARPA demonstrate that an initiative confined to a certain geographic and/or
market space allow for leakage of deforestation activities into other areas not covered by the measure. See
Jeremy Hance, Cerrado: Brazil’s Tropical Woodland, MONGABAY (July 29, 2020),
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/cerrado/.
531. Engaging a large percentage of the relevant actors should be prioritized to avoid leakage. With
greater participation within a market sector, the opportunity for leakage dwindles. To illustrate, a soy
farmer violating SoyM is blocked from selling to SoyM exporters. This limits her ability to sell crops; but
there is a small percentage of the market that will accept them, enabling the deforestation-laden
commodity to “leak.” If SoyM and a new Cattle Agreement could achieve close to 100% participation at
the top-supplier tier of the supply chain, this market initiative will be even more effective at reducing
deforestation.
532. See generally BRAZIL COALITION ON CLIMATE, FORESTS, AND AGRICULTURE: BEEF CHAIN
TRACEABILITY IN BRAZIL, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2020) (highlighting solutions for
monitoring that eliminates cattle laundering).
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information with all partners and the larger national and international communities.
Participants could mimic PRODE’s database to share their data and use a web
platform to disseminate annual reports.
ARPA’s success must be reinforced by international funding, technological
support, and grassroots activism. Expansion of ARPA to cover and protect the entire
deforestation frontier, creating a barrier against the expansion of pastures, offers
incredible promise for preventing commercial interests from advancing further into
the forest. This will require sustained activism to pressure both the federal
government into designating more reserves and the international community into
increasing financial support for the management of those areas once designated—
similar to PCAB.
International actors must increase their contributions to the Amazon Fund
to price forest conservation competitively against deforestation activities. If more
states and multinational corporations invested, the increased amount would provide
greater support for Brazil to conserve forest; currently, the contributions do not
“cover even half of the cost [of forest conservation] being incurred by Brazil.”533
Additionally, international actors must not regard their investment as a political
lever, as the Fund already has a mechanism for signaling to Brazil that increased
deforestation is disfavored: a reduced reward.534 Instead of using financing as an
ephemeral and unpredictable negotiation tool,535 international funders should
stabilize their donations, demonstrating to Brazil that their commitments are reliable
and lasting.
Due to the lack of evidence to support the impact of certification schemes
in the Amazon, the focus should remain on industry-wide agreements such as SoyM
and the proposed CattleM. Voluntary corporate commitments should either invest in
the structures enabling SoyM and CattleM or donate directly to the Amazon Fund,
ceasing the expenditure of resources on company-specific commitments. The EUMercosur trade agreement should be postponed, at least until the other
recommendations included here are implemented.
Finally, the UN must consolidate its organizations, conventions, forums,
and projects that touch on forest conservation to reduce waste and increase synergy.
In doing so, the UN must critically analyze the impact of some of its own initiatives,
such as the ITTO, and terminate those that have proven harmful to forest
conservation.536 These actions will improve the UN’s efficiency, create greater
coordination (and ideally an overarching framework), and enable the UN to play to
its strength: convening global leaders to build consensus and momentum.
533. Boucher, Roquemore, & Fitzhugh, supra note 54, at 442.
534. When Germany and Norway suspended their funding (combined, 99% of the fund’s income) after
the fires in 2019, they removed any incentive that the fund might have been creating to deter President
Bolsonaro from allowing or enabling more deforestation. See Rueters Staff, supra note 246 and
accompanying text.
535. Consider also the divergent impact of presidential candidate Biden’s $20 billion offer and the $80
million investment in the ongoing PCAB. See Charner & Kottasová, supra note 466; 2018 PCAB ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 129, at 14.
536. See Zimmerman & Kormos, supra note 108, at 479 (“A convincing body of evidence shows that
as it is presently codified, sustainable forest-management (SFM) logging implemented at an industrial
scale [such as ITTO] guarantees commercial and biological depletion of high-value timber species within
[the Brazilian Amazon]. . . . These results beg for a reevaluation of the [UNFCCC] proposals.”).
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Diversify to Create Resiliency

The Bolsonaro administration has disrupted the ability of some
international initiatives to respond to the recent increase in deforestation. These
challenges have highlighted that initiatives must be flexible and able to withstand
changes in government leadership and policy. While part of increasing resiliency is
simply adequate funding that prices forest conservation attractively, another aspect
is increasing the durability of institutions.
For example, the Amazon Fund is currently without management due to
Brazil’s federal administration’s anti-conservation agenda.537 In 2019, President
Bolsonaro abolished the Fund’s technical and steering committees and then
“demanded far-reaching changes in the way the Fund is managed.”538 The Fund
remains without management as of January 2022.539 As an initiative created under
the UN’s REDD+ program, the UN should implement a resiliency mechanism. For
example, the REDD+ program administrators could engage with local Brazil-based
and run NGOs to continue the Fund’s work and facilitate international donations
until the Brazilian government appoints leadership.
Another strategy is to continue and expand the use of “conjoined
accounts”—the ability to bypass federal government bureaucracy when needed, as
ARPA has done successfully.540 To implement this effectively, international actors
must respect Brazil’s sovereignty and use the conjoined accounts approach only as
needed, building it into initiatives as an emergency practice. In implementation, this
will mean the direction of funds should be directly to Brazil’s federal, subnational,
and Indigenous environmental protection efforts, rather than transferring the funds
to the federal government to disburse.
C.

Coordinate and Cooperate

It is no doubt challenging to coordinate the efforts of some 35 UN
organizations,541 50 forest certification schemes,542 100 environmental groups,543 and

537. Amazon Fund, Management, AMAZON FUND, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/amazon-fund/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2022), (“The presidential decree enacted on April 11 2019 (Decree n. 9759/2019)
extinguished all committees created by decrees or other administrative acts before January, 1st 2019. . . .
To date, the new governance of the Amazon Fund has not been established.”).
538. Sue Branford & Thais Borges, Norway Freezes Support for Amazon Fund; EU/Brazil Trade Deal
at Risk?, MONGABAY (Aug. 16, 2019), https://news.mongabay.com/2019/08/norway-freezes-support-foramazon-fund-eu-brazil-trade-deal-at-risk/.
539. See Amazon Fund Guidance Committee, AMAZON FUND,
http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/amazon-fund/COFA/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
540. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
541. See Vidal, supra note 153 (“According to the International Institute for Sustainable Development
at least 35 UN organisations [sic] now influence global environmental governance. They are located in
different places, often with overlapping or duplicate mandates, have varying levels of autonomy and all
focus on separate, but interrelated, environmental problems.”).
542. Sustainable Forest Management Toolbox: Forest Certification, FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG.,
http://www.fao.org/sustainable-forest-management/toolbox/modules/forest-certification/in-moredepth/en/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
543. Elizabeth Heilman Brooke, As Forests Fall, Environmental Movement Rises in Brazil, N.Y TIMES
(June 2, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/02/news/as-forests-fall-environmental-movementrises-in-brazil.html.
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760 corporate commitments to zero deforestation.544 However, the urgency of the
current situation compels cooperation: there is no time to dilute resources over a
dizzying array of overlapping, and even competing, initiatives. Cooperation can be
nurtured at UN events, which have proven successful at convening global actors on
environmental issues and engendering action in the Amazon since 1972.545 The UN
can also serve as a platform for coordination, expanding its current role of data
collection.546
International actors must coordinate on standards and definitions
surrounding forest conservation. The result will be a universal language of
conservation where “zero deforestation” actually means zero deforestation.
Cooperation should also be manifested in universal measurement procedures.
Additionally, international actors should cooperate on third-party monitoring
mechanisms to increase transparency and decrease the cost of monitoring on any one
party. This will facilitate data collection and evaluation, allowing for informed
decisions and continual adjustments. Most importantly, it will enable accountability
because information will be available to check actors’ actions against their words.
D.

Increase Communication with the Global Community

International actors at all levels must increase communication so that
actions can be coordinated and actors can be held accountable. Freedom of access to
forest data is crucial to feed the global grassroots activism accountability
mechanisms which have proven so effective in the past. Without public knowledge
of how much rainforest is being deforested and what the potential impacts are, global
activism cannot play its role of pressuring actors to change. Additionally, a lack of
transparency in supply chains or within voluntary corporate commitments inhibits
accountability and requires investigative journalists to invest an incredible amount
of resources to acquire the same information corporate and government actors
already generate.547
CONCLUSION: MOBILIZING ACTION
In Part III, this Article identified and analyzed effective Amazon protection
strategies and their components. Part IV proposed modifying and expanding such
effective strategies using existing structures and systems. This Conclusion turns to
the mechanics of mobilizing large-scale action before it is too late. The clock is
ticking: the tipping point to savannization is dangerously near.548 A corresponding
tipping point must be triggered within the international community, an impetus

544. There were an estimated 760 commitments among 447 companies in 2017. Implementing and
Scaling Up the CGF Zero Net Deforestation Commitment, supra note 304.
545. See Nicolle & Leroy, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
546. See, e.g., FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S FORESTS (2020).
547. See e.g., Dom Phillips et al., Revealed: Rampant Deforestation of Amazon Driven by Global
Greed
for
Meat,
GUARDIAN
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/02/revealed-amazon-deforestation-driven-globalgreed-meat-brazil.
548. Thomas E. Lovejoy & Carlos Nobre, Editorial, Amazon Tipping Point: Last Chance for Action,
5 SCI. ADVANCES 1 (Dec. 20, 2019) (“The tipping point is here, it is now”).
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igniting collective action among the myriad actors with the power to support the
Amazon’s protection.
Just as the last forty years provide lessons for effective anti-deforestation
strategies, they also provide the catalyst for collective action. On multiple occasions,
international concern heightened and pressure intensified to a reactive level. This
pressure was released only when responsible, powerful actors responded with
promises to change, commitments to invest, and new or revitalized initiatives. The
Rio Earth Summit of 1992 cultivated an international norm of forest conservation
and inspired third-party certification schemes;549 the 2002 World Conference on
Sustainable Development inspired ARPA and stimulated Brazil’s enhanced
enforcement of its environmental laws;550 and in 2006 and 2009, Greenpeace’s
scathing reports on the destruction caused by Brazil’s soy and cattle industries
resulted in SoyM and the Cattle Agreement.551 Each of these events galvanized and
coordinated global pressure and channeled it to trigger responsive action and,
ultimately, decreased deforestation.
These two approaches to motivating action—global governance and NGOlead social movements—require profoundly different inputs. Creating international
pressure and momentum through summits and agreements involves an incredible
investment of time, effort, and resources from a select few powerful actors.552
Conversely, Greenpeace creates pressure through a three-pronged strategy that
simultaneously proposes national legislation or executive action, identifies large,
visible market actors as villains, and mobilizes a social movement through mass and
social media.553 Greenpeace’s strategy empowers the public, spreading the burden of
action across many for the initial stages of the campaign.
Greenpeace’s strategy provides the flexibility to act immediately. Part IV
identified the national legislative and executive action to propose as well as the
corporations to be labeled villains.554 The mass media prong was sparked by the 2019
fires,555 but needs to be rekindled. Crucially, in order to “mobilize large-scale
demand for change,” the social movement must pivot from its focus on individual
responsibility and behavior changes (“eat less meat,”556 buy more “conscious”
brands)557 to unite and connect people through a common goal:558 deforestation

549.
550.
551.
552.

See Jopke & Schoneveld, supra note 302, at 3.
See supra notes 50, 351 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See generally Jon Hovi et al., Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation, 62
ENVTL & RESOURCE ECON. 665 (2015).
553. See generally E. A. Syarifuddin et al., The Market Campaign Strategy of Greenpeace in
Decreasing Rainforest Deforestation in Indonesia, 575 IOP CONF. SERIES: EARTH & ENV’T SCI. 1 (2020).
554. See supra Part IV.
555. See Yair Oded supra note 7 and accompanying text.
556. See, e.g., Edoardo Liotta, Feeling Sad About the Amazon Fires? Stop Eating Meat, VICE (Aug.
23, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/bjwzk4/feeling-sad-about-the-amazon-fires-stop-eatingmeat.
557. See, e.g., Alexandra Haddow, Seven Ways You Can Help Save the Amazon Rainforest, INDY 100
(Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.indy100.com/news/how-to-save-amazon-rainforest-fires-climate-changebrazil-9076416.
558. Christina Vogel et al., Preconception Nutrition, 12 J. DEV. ORIGINS HUM. HEALTH & DISEASE
141, 144 (2020).
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reduction through the strategies outlined in Part IV. The distinct pieces of such a
strategy are ready to go; all that is needed is an international NGO to champion it.
Let this Article serve as the formal request for the third installment of the “Eating
Up the Amazon” series.

